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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Equity of access to health care is regarded as a key objective of national and international health policy. 
As the first point of contact for most individuals’ interactions with the health service, the role of the 
general practitioner (GP) is crucial. GPs in Ireland act as gatekeepers for access to secondary care services; 
therefore, GPs play a pivotal role in providing a wide range of primary care services to the population, and 
by extension, reducing reliance on more costly acute hospital services. The current Irish system of financing 
GP care is unusual internationally as over half the population pay the full cost of GP care at the point of 
use. In summer 2015, free GP care for all children aged under 6 years and all adults aged 70+ years was 
introduced, and the current Programme for Government commits to the extension of free GP care to all 
under 18 years of age. 
International research has shown that timely access to appropriate health care may have significant 
positive effects on child health. In addition, child health has a strong causal relationship with later life 
outcomes such as education and employment as well as adult health. Better Outcomes, Brighter Futures, 
the national policy framework for children and young people in Ireland, highlights the importance of early 
intervention and prevention for improving child health outcomes, noting that what happens early in life 
affects health and wellbeing in later life. In this context, it is important to understand the extent to which 
the current system of healthcare financing in Ireland, and in particular, eligibility for primary care free at 
the point of delivery, shapes the pattern of GP use adjusting for the need for health care. Such an analysis 
also contributes to an assessment of the possible impact of extending free GP care to further groups of 
children on the demand for GP services.
Growing up in Ireland (GUI), the national longitudinal study of children in Ireland, offers the ideal evidence 
base with which to evaluate the impact of the current system of public healthcare eligibility on GP utilisation 
among children in Ireland. GUI was established in 2006 with the objective of describing the lives of children 
in Ireland, establishing what is typical and normal, as well as what is atypical and problematic, in order to 
improve Irish policy and services. GUI surveys two cohorts of children, an Infant Cohort and a Child Cohort. 
This report focuses on the Infant Cohort. The Infant Cohort of over 11,000 children and their families was 
first surveyed between September 2008 and April 2009 when the children were 9 months old. From January 
2011 to August 2011, the families were contacted again, when the children were 3 years of age, and 88 per 
cent of families participated in the second wave. In addition to providing comprehensive data on multiple 
domains of child and family life, the availability of longitudinal data (i.e., repeated observations on the 
same children) allows us to investigate the impact of changes in eligibility for free GP care on changes in 
GP visiting over time. 
Using data from the first two waves of the Infant Cohort of GUI (i.e., when the children were aged 9 
months and 3 years), this report examines the following research questions:
•	 Does	eligibility	for	free	GP	care	affect	children’s	use	of	GP	services?	
•	 Does	type	of	private	health	insurance	cover	affect	children’s	use	of	GP	services?	
•	 Are	user	fees	for	GP	care	a	particular	burden	on	children	from	low	income	families	without	a	
medical card? 
•	 As	children	are	dependent	on	their	parents	for	decision-making	in	relation	to	healthcare	
utilisation, do parental characteristics (e.g., family structure, education, employment status, etc.) 
affect their child’s use of GP services?
The report distinguishes between five mutually exclusive categories of public healthcare eligibility, which 
differ in the degree to which the patient faces user fees for primary care services:
•	 Full	medical	card	–	free	GP	visits	at	the	point	of	use;
•	 GP	visit	card	–	free	GP	visits	at	the	point	of	use;
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•	 Private	health	insurance,	with	cover	for	GP	expenses	–	full	cost,	with	full	or	partial	reimbursement	
by private health insurance;
•	 Private	health	insurance,	without	GP	cover	–	full	cost;
•	 ‘No	cover’,	i.e.,	without	a	full	medical	card,	GP	visit	card	or	private	health	insurance	–	full	cost.
When the children were aged 3 years in 2011, 34 per cent had a full medical card, 4 per cent had a 
GP visit card, 26 per cent had private health insurance with GP cover, 20 per cent had private health 
insurance	without	GP	cover,	and	16	per	cent	had	‘no	cover’.	In	2008	in	contrast	(i.e.,	just	as	the	recession	
was beginning), when the children were aged 9 months, rates of full medical and GP visit card cover were 
significantly lower (at 26 per cent and 3 per cent respectively), and rates of private health insurance cover 
were significantly higher (29 per cent had private health insurance with GP cover, and 23 per cent had 
private health insurance with no GP cover). 
GP visiting information refers to the number of GP visits in the previous 12 months, reported by the primary 
caregiver (the recall period is 9 months for wave 1). Both waves of the data contain detailed information on 
child health, household socio-economic characteristics and parental health and behaviours. Independent 
variables are grouped into those reflecting need for health care (e.g., child health status, birth weight, 
etc.), and those related to the socio-economic characteristics of the household (e.g., income, urban/rural 
location, etc.). 
The analysis found:
•	 At	both	9	months	and	3	years	of	age,	children	with	a	full	medical	or	GP	visit	card	(i.e.,	who	are	
entitled to free GP visits) had a significantly higher number of GP visits per annum than children 
with	‘no	cover’	(i.e.,	without	a	full	medical	card,	GP	visit	card	or	private	health	insurance),	even	
after adjusting for differences in health need and other family and child characteristics between 
the groups (Chapter 2);
•	 In	comparison	with	those	with	‘no	cover’	(i.e.,	without	a	full	medical	card,	GP	visit	card	or	private	
health insurance), children with private health insurance with no GP cover had a significantly 
higher number of GP visits, despite both groups facing the full out-of-pocket cost of GP care 
(Chapter 2);
•	 Children	who	gained	a	full	medical	or	GP	visit	card	between	the	age	of	9	months	and	3	years	had	
a higher number of GP visits compared to children who remained paying the full price of GP care 
between the age of 9 months and 3 years. Becoming eligible for a full medical or GP visit card was 
associated with an increase of 0.6 GP visits (or 25 per cent) (Chapter 4);
•	 However,	for	those	who	lost	a	full	medical	or	GP	visit	card	between	the	age	of	9	months	and	3	
years, there was no significant difference in the number of GP visits in comparison with those 
children who retained their full medical or GP visit card (i.e., having free GP care) (Chapter 4);
•	 Focusing	on	those	children	without	a	full	medical	or	GP	visit	card,	there	is	evidence	that	children	
in higher income households had a higher number of GP visits (particularly at the age of 9 
months), suggesting barriers to access among lower income children without a full medical or GP 
visit card (Chapter 3);
•	 Focusing	on	other	family	characteristics,	it	was	found	that	mother’s	health	status	was	a	significant	
determinant of her child’s use of GP services, with children of mothers with poorer health having 
higher levels of GP visiting. Other socio-economic characteristics of the mother such as education 
were not significant however (Chapter 3).
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These results suggest a number of implications for policy. First, while child health is an important 
determinant of GP visiting in Ireland, public healthcare entitlements are also important, with those who 
face the full out-of-pocket cost of GP care having significantly fewer GP visits. The data do not allow 
us to assess whether those without a full medical or GP visit card in the Irish context are foregoing 
‘necessary’	care.	However	evidence	from	other	settings	suggests	that	removing	financial	barriers	to	access	
to healthcare among children has a significant positive impact on child health, and later-life outcomes. 
Second, notwithstanding current policy proposals, this report provides evidence to show that income was 
an important determinant of GP visiting for children without a full medical or GP visit card, particularly at 
age 9 months. By age 3 however, this effect was largely absent, suggesting that wider eligibility for a full 
medical or GP visit card during the recession may have protected those who were previously above the 
threshold. Finally, the estimates from the longitudinal analysis (where the same children and families were 
observed at 9 months and 3 years of age) are directly relevant to current policy proposals. The analysis 
shows that for those children who became eligible for a full medical or GP visit card between the age of 
9 months and 3 years, there was an increase in the annual number of GP visits of approximately 0.6 visits, 
or approximately 25 per cent. This estimate does not distinguish between gaining a full medical and a GP 
visit card, and does not take into account possible changes in health need that may have also occurred over 
that period. However, the analysis provides additional information for policymakers currently tasked with 
extending free GP care to other groups of children, and may aid policymakers in costing future proposals 
and assessing the capacity implications of this increased demand.
9Chapter 1
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1 A distinction is made between eligibility and entitlement. For example, where an individual applies for and meets the qualifications/
requirements	for	a	benefit,	he	or	she	is	‘eligible’	to	receive	the	benefits	offered.	The	benefits	offered	(e.g.	free	public	healthcare)	refer	to	the	
specific	‘entitlements’	that	must	be	provided	to	those	that	are	eligible.
2  Since October 2010, full medical-card holders must pay a fixed copayment per item for prescription medicines (currently €2.50, up to a 
maximum of €25 per family per month).
3  Those in Category II are liable for the entire cost of prescription medicines, up to a monthly deductible of €144 per family.
4 Table 4.1 in Evetovits et al. (2012) summarises entitlements to public healthcare in Ireland in greater detail.
5		In	April	2012,	3.2	per	cent	of	full	medical	cards	and	14.3	per	cent	of	GP	visit	cards	were	issued	on	a	‘discretionary’	basis	(HSE,	2013).
6  Retention of a full medical card for a specified period, without means-testing, is also permitted for specific circumstances (e.g. participation 
in government employment/education schemes; retention of medical card for three years after return to work from a period of 
unemployment of 12 months or more).
7  Supplementary or duplicative PHI offers access to health services that are already covered by the public health system, offers subscribers 
greater choice of provider (often private providers) and enables them to bypass waiting lists for publicly financed treatment. Complementary 
PHI may cover services that are excluded from the public healthcare system, or it may reimburse the costs of public user charges (Thomson 
and Mossialos, 2009).
8		In	2009,	an	estimated	46	per	cent	of	the	population	held	PHI	only;	5	per	cent	held	both	a	full	medical/GP	visit	card	and	PHI	(‘dual	cover’);	30	
per cent held a full medical card or GP visit card only, and 19 per cent had no full medical/GP visit card or PHI (Brick et al., 2010). See Chapter 
2 for data on children.
1.1 CONTEXT
Equity of access to healthcare is regarded as a key objective of national and international health policy. 
As the first point of contact with the health service, the role of the general practitioner (GP) is crucial. 
GPs in Ireland act as gatekeepers for access to secondary care services; therefore, GPs play a pivotal role 
in providing a wide range of primary care services to the population, and, by extension, reducing reliance 
on more costly acute hospital services (Nolan et al., 2007). The current Irish system of financing GP care is 
unusual internationally because a large proportion of the population are obliged to pay the full cost of 
GP care at the point of use (Ruane, 2010; Smith, 2010; Evetovits et al., 2012). A major reform of this system 
was announced in 2011, comprising the introduction of a system of universal health insurance (UHI) and 
free GP care for all, regardless of income. The first pillar of the reform, the introduction of UHI, in the form 
of competing private insurers, was delayed initially and then shelved after recent research illustrated how 
expenditure would increase substantially under the proposed model of UHI (Wren et al., 2015), and would 
not achieve universal coverage (Wren and Connolly, 2016). The second main pillar of the reform was the 
introduction of free GP care at the point of use for all, on a phased basis by age. In summer 2015, free GP 
care for all children aged under six years and all adults aged 70+ years was introduced and current plans 
commit to the extension of free GP care to the under-18s (Government of Ireland, 2016).
Currently, there are two main categories of eligibility1 for public health services in Ireland. Those in Category 
I (full medical-card holders) are entitled to free public health services (including GP services),2 while those 
in Category II are entitled to subsidised public hospital services and prescription medicines,3 but must pay 
the full cost of GP services (and in general, GPs charge the same fee for adult and child consultations). In 
2010, the average cost of a GP consultation was estimated at €51 (National Consumer Agency, 2010). In 
October 2005, the GP visit card was introduced; GP visit-card holders have the same entitlements to free 
GP care as Category I individuals, but the same entitlements as Category II individuals for all other public 
health services (including prescription medicines).4 
Eligibility for a full medical/GP visit card is assessed primarily on the basis of an income means test. The 
income thresholds for the GP visit card are 50 per cent higher than for the full medical card. In certain 
cases, individuals who are otherwise ineligible for a full medical/GP visit card may be granted a card on 
a	 ‘discretionary’	 basis,	 if	 they	 have	 particular	 health	 needs	which	would	 cause	 them	undue	hardship.5 
There is also a small number of groups with automatic entitlement to a full medical card (e.g. foster 
children).6  Over the period 2001-2008, all individuals aged 70 years and over were automatically entitled 
to a full medical card (not including dependants), regardless of income (Government of Ireland, 2001). The 
automatic entitlement was removed from 1 January 2009 (Government of Ireland, 2008). Since July 2015, 
all those aged over 70 are automatically entitled to a GP visit card. 
A further layer of complexity is added to the Irish system by the existence of private health insurance (PHI), 
which plays both a supplementary and complementary role in the Irish healthcare system.7  Just under 50 
per cent of the population have PHI, which mainly provides cover for private acute hospital services (which 
may be delivered in public hospitals), but which increasingly offers full or partial reimbursement of certain 
primary care expenses. Full medical-card and GP visit-card holders may take out PHI if they wish, but the 
numbers	with	such	‘dual	cover’	are	small.8  
9 See www.citizensinformation.ie/en/health/health_services/children_s_health/immunisations_for_children.html for further details [last accessed 
18 August 2016].
10 Growing Up in Ireland data does not include information on the particular details/name of the PHI plan, and so the net price of a GP visit for 
those with PHI and full/partial GP cover cannot be calculated.
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Figure 1.1 illustrates the proportion of the population in Categories I and II over the period 1990-2015, 
with GP visit-card holders identified separately. The proportion of the population in Category I was around 
35 per cent throughout the early to mid-1990s, but with more rapid economic growth, a steady decline in 
unemployment and annual increases in real incomes, the proportion of the population in Category I began 
to fall from the late 1990s (and fell to its lowest level of 28.0 per cent in 2005). From 2007, as the economy 
entered a severe and prolonged recession, the proportion with a full medical card increased steadily, 
before falling back somewhat as the economy began to recover. The large increase in GP visit-card cover 
in 2015 reflects the extension of free GP cover to all children under six and all adults over 70 in that year.
Figure 1.1:  Public healthcare eligibility (% of the population), 1990-2015
 
Source: Adapted from Figure 4.1 in Evetovits et al. (2012), and updated.
Eligibility for a full medical or GP visit card entitles dependants (including children) to free GP services. 
Some additional primary care services are provided free of charge to children even if their parents do 
not have a full medical or GP visit card. These services are generally provided as part of maternity and 
infant welfare services (two free postnatal GP visits), health services for preschool children (home visits by 
public-health nurses, and a full developmental check at age nine months) and school health services (free 
vision and hearing examinations). Children are also entitled to vaccination and immunisation services free 
of charge.9 Chapter 2 will provide further details on the proportion of children in the various eligibility 
categories.
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While full medical-card and GP visit-card holders receive free GP visits, this report distinguishes between 
them as GP visit-card holders face the full cost of any associated prescription medicines (up to a monthly 
deductible of €144); if individuals consider the likelihood of receiving a prescription when deciding to visit 
their GP, it could be expected that GP visit-card holders would have fewer GP visits than full medical-card 
holders.11 Similarly, this report distinguishes between those with PHI who have no cover for GP expenses, 
and	those	who	have	‘no	cover’	at	all	as	it	is	possible	that	those	with	PHI	may	be	able	to	substitute	GP	care	
with alternative services.12  Finally, the report identifies those with (full or partial) cover for GP expenses 
as part of their PHI plan as, in addition to the price effect, there may be an effect from the type of 
reimbursement (in this case, retrospective).13  
 
Table 1.1:  Primary healthcare entitlements and GP reimbursement methods in Irelanda
Notes: 
a  Current as of February 2017
b  In Ireland, tax relief at the standard rate (20 per cent) is available on certain medical expenses (including GP and prescription fees) that are 
not otherwise reimbursed by the State or PHI.
c  The patient copayment for prescription medicines for full medical-card holders was introduced in October 2010 (at €0.50 per item, up to a 
maximum of €10 per family per month). It was increased to €1.50 from January 2013, and to €2.50 per item from December 2013.
d  From 2008 to 2011 (the period in which the data used in this study were collected), the monthly deductible was €90 in 2008, €100 in 2009 
and €120 in 2010 and 2011 (Gorecki et al., 2012; Brick et al., 2013). 
This report is primarily interested in the effect of financial incentives facing the patient (in this case, the 
patient’s parents), but GP visiting behaviour may also be influenced by the financial incentives facing the 
GP (Barros et al., 2008). GPs receive a capitation payment for full medical-card and GP visit-card holders 
(some additional services are reimbursed by means of a separate fee-for-service (FFS) payment, e.g. 
vaccinations), and an FFS payment from private patients. These different methods of provider payment 
incentivise different forms of provider behaviour. For example, while FFS payments promote productivity 
and access, they also provide a disincentive to engage in preventive care and score poorly in terms of cost 
containment. On the other hand, capitation payments discourage productivity, but (with appropriate risk 
adjustment) promote access and preventive care and can be effective in controlling costs (Brick et al., 
2012). The financial incentives facing the patient and provider therefore work in opposite directions for all 
five eligibility groups identified in Table 1.1, with the possible exception of those with PHI with full/partial 
GP cover, where the combination of free/subsidised GP care and an FFS payment may lead to GP visits in 
excess of those predicted by need (Brick et al., 2012). While it is difficult to distinguish between the two 
effects here, it is worth noting that previous research on supplier-induced demand among Irish GPs found 
evidence both for and against the existence of supplier-induced demand (Madden et al., 2005; Tussing, 
1983; Tussing, 1985).
11 Data on prescription medicine use are not available in Growing Up in Ireland; however, previous research based on adult data has 
demonstrated that full medical and GP visit cardholders differ with respect to their use of GP services, despite facing the same price for GP 
services (Nolan and Smith, 2012). Canadian evidence has also shown that individuals consider the cost of prescriptions when deciding to visit 
their GP (Allin and Hurley, 2009; Fast and Williamson, 1998).
12  However, GPs act as gatekeepers for secondary care in Ireland. Information on the use of emergency department (ED) services, which may be 
used as a substitute for GP care by some groups, is not separately identifiable in the data from use of outpatient services. One of the largest 
private insurers (VHI Healthcare) operates a number of outpatient clinics that provide GP-like services to subscribers (albeit for a fee that is in 
excess of the average GP fee), and which have considerably longer opening hours (from 8am-10pm seven days a week). 
13  Zhong (2011) found that the effect of insurance on the probability of contact with outpatient services in China was greater for policies with 
immediate reimbursement (rather than policies with retrospective reimbursement). In the Irish case, all PHI policies that offer (full or partial) 
cover for GP expenses involve retrospective reimbursement.
GP User Feeb Prescription User Feeb GP Reimbursement
Full medical card Free €2.50 per item up to a 
maximum of €25 per family per 
monthc
Primarily capitation; fee-for-
service for selected ‘special 
items of service’
GP visit card Free Full cost up to €144 per family 
per month; free thereafterd
Primarily capitation; fee-for-
service for selected ‘special 
items of service’
PHI with GP cover Full cost, with full or partial 
reimbursement by PHI company
Full cost up to €144 per family 
per month; free thereafterd
Fee-for-service
PHI without GP cover Full cost Full cost up to €144 per family 
per month; free thereafterd
Fee-for-service
No cover Full cost Full cost up to €144 per family 
per month; free thereafterd
Fee-for-service
13
14 Moral hazard refers to the concept whereby health insurance, by lowering the marginal cost of care to the individual, may increase use of 
healthcare services (Pauly, 1968). It can be either beneficial or undesirable under different conditions; for example, some moral hazard may 
be desirable when the quantity of healthcare consumed falls short of the optimum (Zhong, 2011). Jones et al. (2006) use the broader term 
‘insurance	effect’	to	encompass	the	effects	of	moral	hazard,	risk	reduction,	income	transfer	and	access	that	are	all	associated	with	insurance	
cover.
15  Vera-Hernandez (1999) uses social class and occupation as instruments for duplicate insurance cover in his analysis of specialist use in 
Catalonia. He argues that these variables should be unrelated to use once income and education have been included in the model. Meer and 
Rosen (2004) use self-employment status.
16  On the other hand, Schellhorn (2001) found that most of the observed lower number of doctor visits among those with insurance contracts 
with higher deductibles in Switzerland could be attributed to selection of low-risk individuals into such contracts; Vera-Hernandez (1999) 
found evidence of adverse selection (but only among heads of households) in the purchase of duplicate PHI in Catalonia, and Cameron et al. 
(1998) found that the positive effect of insurance on healthcare use in Australia was explained by both moral hazard and adverse selection.
1.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH
As noted, the Irish system of eligibility for free GP care is unusual internationally (e.g. the UK NHS provides 
free GP care at the point of use to the entire population). Given this system, and current proposals for 
reform, it is vitally important to investigate the effect of the current system on GP visiting patterns. 
International research on the impact of different healthcare financing systems on GP use, and healthcare 
use more generally, is well developed, although it largely focuses on the adult population. 
A key feature of healthcare markets is uncertainty – i.e. lack of information about the future. Ill-health 
is inherently unpredictable, both in terms of financial costs and physical and emotional suffering. This 
necessitates a role for insurance in offering the patient protection against uncertainty. Most developed 
countries therefore provide publicly financed insurance for many health services for most of the population, 
although there is considerable variation in the extent to which different population groups are covered 
(the	‘breadth’	of	cover),	what	healthcare	services	are	covered	(the	‘scope’	of	cover)	and	the	extent	of	user	
fees	(the	‘height’	of	cover)	(see	also	Evetovits	et	al.,	2012).	In	this	context,	a	large	literature	has	developed	
around	 the	 issue	 of	 identifying	 the	 impact	 of	 insurance	 on	 healthcare	 use	 (usually	 termed	 the	 ‘moral	
hazard’ effect14). This is complicated by the potential existence of adverse selection; i.e. purchase/receipt of 
insurance is associated with characteristics that are in turn associated with use of healthcare (Buchmueller 
et al., 2004). Ignoring adverse selection may lead to an overestimation of the impact of insurance on the 
use of health services. Strategies for separately identifying the moral hazard effect of insurance depend 
largely on the data available to the researcher. Some studies use the instrumental variables approach – 
i.e. finding variables that are correlated with insurance but not with healthcare use. Since finding such 
variables can be challenging,15  the more common solution to this problem is to include sufficient controls 
for health status, although this does not rule out the possibility of adverse selection based on unobservable 
characteristics (e.g. degree of risk aversion). In the context of PHI, another strategy is to contrast the 
effect of employer-provided insurance with insurance purchased by individuals, on the assumption that 
individuals do not choose their employer to gain insurance cover (Buchmueller et al., 2004; Ettner, 1997).
 
In the Irish context, no evidence for adverse selection in the purchase of PHI has been found. In fact, 
Harmon and Nolan (2001) found that those in better health were significantly more likely to purchase 
PHI, and similar results have also been found for the purchase of PHI in other countries; e.g. in France 
(Buchmueller et al., 2004); the US (Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Meer and Rosen, 2004), Australia (Cameron et 
al., 1998) and Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK (Jones et al., 2006).16  In contrast, those with a full 
medical card in Ireland have been shown to be in significantly poorer health than those with PHI and/or 
‘no	cover’	(Nolan	et	al.,	2007).
Other potential sources of bias in estimating the effect of insurance on healthcare use include health 
screening by insurance companies, and supplier-induced demand (SID) (Barros et al., 2008). The former 
would lead to an underestimation of the effect of insurance, the latter to an overestimation. The 
inducement of demand is likely to be stronger when insurance companies use FFS payments to reimburse 
providers. It is difficult to distinguish between the moral hazard and supplier-induced demand effects of 
insurance without detailed data on whether visits to the GP are initiated by the patient or by the provider. 
Van Dijk et al. (2013) used data with this information from the Netherlands and found no evidence for 
moral hazard but evidence of SID as a result of the introduction of the system of universal health insurance 
in 2006 (which abolished patient copayments for GP services, and changed GP remuneration from a 
GP User Feeb Prescription User Feeb GP Reimbursement
Full medical card Free €2.50 per item up to a 
maximum of €25 per family per 
monthc
Primarily capitation; fee-for-
service for selected ‘special 
items of service’
GP visit card Free Full cost up to €144 per family 
per month; free thereafterd
Primarily capitation; fee-for-
service for selected ‘special 
items of service’
PHI with GP cover Full cost, with full or partial 
reimbursement by PHI company
Full cost up to €144 per family 
per month; free thereafterd
Fee-for-service
PHI without GP cover Full cost Full cost up to €144 per family 
per month; free thereafterd
Fee-for-service
No cover Full cost Full cost up to €144 per family 
per month; free thereafterd
Fee-for-service
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capitation based system to a mixed system of capitation and FFS respectively).17  In the Irish context, there 
is conflicting evidence on the existence of SID (Tussing, 1985; Tussing, 1983; Madden et al., 2005).18  
Ideally, a natural experiment or quasi-experimental approach would be used to examine the causal effect of 
insurance on healthcare use. The first study to show the impact of insurance on the use of health services in 
a truly experimental setting was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), carried out in six sites across 
four US states between 1974 and 1977. Families participating in the experiment were randomly assigned to 
one of 14 different insurance plans that differed in the degree of cost-sharing for health services. Significant 
effects of insurance on the use of a variety of healthcare services were observed (Newhouse and Insurance 
Experiment Group, 1993; Manning et al., 1987). Quasi-experimental approaches that exploit policy changes 
in insurance cover have been carried out by Busch and Duchovny (2005), Chiappori and Geoffard (1998), 
Grignon et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2007), for the US, France and Taiwan respectively. 
Despite differences in time periods, country contexts, data sources, methods and type of healthcare use 
(i.e. GP care, inpatient hospital care, etc), the findings on the effect of insurance are largely unambiguous; 
insurance, by lowering the cost of care, leads to an increase in healthcare use (Bago d’Uva, 2006; Hurd and 
McGarry, 1997; Busch and Duchovny, 2005; Sapelli and Vial, 2003; Sarma and Simpson, 2006; Grignon et 
al., 2008; Holly et al., 1998; Cameron et al., 1998; Jones et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2012; Card et al., 2008; 
Card et al., 2009; Meer and Rosen, 2004).19  Allin and Hurley (2009) also find that private insurance cover for 
complementary services such as prescription medicines also has a significant effect on the use of GP services 
(in Canada), as individuals with complementary cover for prescription medicine expenses are less deterred 
from seeking GP care by the expected cost of drugs that are often prescribed as a result of a GP visit. The 
literature on the broader question of whether insurance leads to increases in healthcare expenditure is less 
developed; Koch (2013) found significant effects of insurance on healthcare use among children in the US, 
but no significant effects on overall expenditure. Koch attributed this to the crowding-out of PHI induced 
by eligibility for a public health insurance programme.
In studies that focus on children, significant effects of insurance on healthcare use have also been found 
(Currie et al., 2008; Currie and Gruber, 1996; Dafny and Gruber, 2005; Boudreaux et al., 2016; Card and 
Shore-Sheppard, 2004; Palmer et al., 2015), although de la Mata (2012) found significant effects of Medicaid 
eligibility in the US on the use of preventive care for the sample of the poorest children only. The RAND 
HIE found the same outpatient response to insurance for children (aged less than 18 years) as for adults 
(Manning et al., 1987). 
In the context of systems with largely free or heavily subsidised access to public healthcare services, the 
focus in the literature is on identifying horizontal inequities in healthcare use; i.e. differences in use that 
are not related to the need for care (Morris et al., 2005; Gerdtham et al., 1992). A large and well-developed 
literature examines the extent to which there is income-related inequity in healthcare use; i.e. differences 
in healthcare use across income groups that persist even when differences in need for healthcare have 
been taken into account. A number of cross-country comparative analyses of income-related inequity in 
the use of healthcare services among the adult population have been carried out, with Ireland as one of 
the featured countries (van Doorslaer et al., 2000; van Doorslaer et al., 2002; van Doorslaer and Masseria, 
2004; van Doorslaer et al., 2004; van Doorslaer et al., 2006). Across all studies (using a variety of data 
sources covering different time periods), the distribution of GP visits has been found to be significantly 
‘pro-poor’	 in	 Ireland	 (i.e.	 even	 after	 controlling	 for	 the	 significant	 ‘pro-poor’	 distribution	of	 ill-health,	
lower-income individuals have a significantly higher number of GP visits). The most recent analysis of 
income-related inequity in the delivery of healthcare services in Ireland (using data on adults aged 18+ years 
17 Van de Voorde et al. (2001) found no evidence that Belgian doctors engaged in demand inducement as a response to reductions in use 
following a substantial increase in patient copayments.
18 The standard approach to identifying SID is to examine the response of GP use to variables describing differences in GP income (e.g. different 
payment methods for different patients; differences in doctor density; a shock to doctor incomes, etc). For example, Sarma and Simpson 
(2006) find that GP visiting is significantly higher in areas with a higher density of GPs.  
19 Exceptions are van Dijk et al. (2013) who found no evidence for an effect of the abolition of a copayment in the Netherlands on patient-
initiated GP visits, Bauhoff et al. (2011) who found an effect of insurance on the amount of out-of-pocket expenditure, but not use 
of outpatient services in Georgia, and Schellhorn et al. (2000) who found that supplementary insurance had an insignificant effect on 
the number of primary care visits among Swiss residents aged 75+ years. However, particular features of these systems may explain the 
insignificant results (e.g. low levels of the initial copayment in the Dutch study; insurance that does not cover the cost of primary care in the 
Swiss system).  
20  A later paper focused on equity in the use of inpatient hospital services only (Layte, 2007).
21  Bauhoff et al. (2011) also found no effect of an extension in insurance in Georgia on self-assessed health, use of preventive services and 
health-related behaviours, although, once again, the time-frame of the study was thought to be too short to identify significant effects.
22 The study focused on individuals admitted to the emergency department (ED) for relatively severe illnesses, on the assumption that any extra 
services (or improvements in the quality of services) may be expected to have an effect on short-run mortality.
23 The Apgar score is an overall measure of infant health at birth; it was designed to evaluate a newborn’s physical condition after delivery and 
to determine any immediate need for extra medical or emergency care (Lin, 2009).
24 However, a response by Case et al. (2008) to the Currie et al. (2007) study found that the differences between England and the US were 
reduced when data from the same time period were examined.
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from	2000)	found	a	significant	‘pro-poor’	distribution	in	expenditure	on	GP	services	in	Ireland	(and	also	for	
prescription medicines) (Layte and Nolan, 2004).20  As noted by all authors, this result is not surprising given 
the particular structure of entitlements to free GP care in the Irish system. 
In contrast to the Irish evidence, that for other countries is more mixed. For the UK, some studies find 
evidence	of	a	significant	‘pro-poor’	distribution	of	GP	visits	(van	Doorslaer	et	al.,	2004;	van	Doorslaer	et	al.,	
2000; van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004) while others find no significant difference across income groups 
(van Doorslaer et al., 2002; van Doorslaer et al., 2006; Allin et al., 2011). Concerning children, the evidence 
for significant inequities in GP visiting is sparse; an exception is a recent study comparing Irish and Scottish 
children,	which	found	a	significant	‘pro-poor’	distribution	of	GP	visits	in	Ireland,	but	no	income-related	
inequity in GP visiting among Scottish children, a result consistent with the differing healthcare financing 
systems in the two countries (Layte and Nolan, 2015).
Finally, but less frequently due to data constraints, a growing literature has focused on identifying the 
causal impact of different systems of healthcare financing on health outcomes. The effects of insurance 
on health status or outcomes are ambiguous. In a study of over-60s in Taiwan, Chen et al. (2007) found no 
effect of the introduction of public health insurance in 1995 on mortality or self-assessed health (although 
the authors note that the four-year period over which data were available may have been too short to 
identify a significant effect on health outcomes).21  On the other hand, Card et al. (2009) found a statistically 
significant decrease in mortality once individuals become eligible for Medicare in the US at age 65, and 
this effect persisted even up to nine months after admission to hospital.22  A series of studies from the US 
has examined the causal impact of public health insurance on child health outcomes (Currie et al., 2008; 
Currie and Gruber, 1996; Currie, 1995). Currie and Gruber (1996) and Currie et al. (2008) adopted a quasi-
experimental approach to the issue by exploiting differences in Medicaid expansion to children across US 
states and time periods to identify the effect of public health insurance on various health outcomes. Currie 
and Gruber (1996) found that expansions in Medicaid caused reductions in child mortality in children 
aged less than 15 years of age, and in particular in mortality from internal causes, while Currie et al. 
(2008) found that more generous insurance cover in early life was associated with better health status 
at older ages. A related paper by Lin (2009) attributed approximately 40 per cent of the narrowing gap 
in Apgar scores23 in the US over the 1980s and 1990s to increases in access to healthcare. However, de la 
Mata (2012) found no evidence that Medicaid expansions had any significant effect on health outcomes 
among US children aged 5-18 years in the short and medium term (one and five years after becoming 
eligible for Medicaid respectively). A related debate has examined the extent to which socio-economic 
gradients in child health may be weaker in countries with universal access to free or heavily subsidised 
public healthcare. For example, Currie et al. (2007) and Propper et al. (2007) maintained that the absence 
of a socio-economic gradient in parental-assessed general health status in the UK (in contrast to the strong 
gradient found by Case et al. (2002) for the US) may be due to the differing healthcare financing structures 
in the two countries.24  
Not surprisingly, the particular Irish system of eligibility for free GP care has been the focus of an extensive 
literature. While most international studies find that need factors such as age and health status are most 
important in determining GP visiting rates (Hoeck et al., 2011; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2004; Sarma and 
Simpson, 2006; Gerdtham, 1997; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2002), in Ireland, income and public health eligibility 
have been found to be highly significant factors (Layte et al., 2009; Layte and Nolan, 2004; Madden et al., 
2005; Nolan, 2007; Nolan, 2008b; Nolan, 1991; Nolan, 1993; O’Reilly et al., 2007; Nolan, 2008a; Nolan and 
Smith, 2012). Findings such as these raise concerns about possible horizontal inequities in GP visiting rates 
between different population groups, and the extent to which stated health policy regarding access to 
healthcare is being achieved in practice. However, previous research on patterns of GP use in Ireland have 
largely concentrated on the adult population. With the exception of a study from the early 1980s (Tussing, 
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25 Unfortunately, the availability of two waves is not sufficiently long to examine the impact of eligibility on child health, but this crucial 
question will be examined as further waves of the Infant Cohort become available.
1985) and a later descriptive study (Fallon et al., 2007), there is a lack of evidence for children in Ireland, 
although two recent papers have examined GP visiting patterns, using the first wave of the Infant (nine-
month) and Child (nine-year) Cohorts of Growing up in Ireland (Layte and Nolan, 2014; Layte and Nolan, 
2015).
1.3 OBJECTIVES
In light of the findings that inequities in access to healthcare among children may have significant effects 
on child health status, and given the strong causal links that have been demonstrated between childhood 
health and later outcomes such as employment and health status (Case et al., 2005), it is particularly 
important to examine the extent to which the current Irish system of eligibility for free GP care leads 
to differences in the use of GP services that are not explained by the person’s need for healthcare (i.e. 
horizontal inequities). Better Outcomes, Brighter Futures, the national policy framework for children and 
young people in Ireland, highlights the importance of early intervention and prevention for improving 
child health outcomes, noting that what happens early in life affects health and wellbeing in later life. A 
key commitment of Better Outcomes, Brighter Futures is the introduction of universal general practitioner 
(GP) care (Department of Children and Youth Affairs, 2014). Growing up in Ireland was established in 2006 
with the objective of describing the lives of children in Ireland, identifying what is typical and normal, as 
well as what is atypical and problematic, in order to improve Irish policy and services (Greene et al., 2010). 
Child outcomes across three broad domains are considered:
•	 Physical	health	and	development
•	 Social/emotional/behavioural	wellbeing	
•	 Educational	achievement	and	intellectual	capacity
Growing up in Ireland therefore offers an ideal source of evidence with which to evaluate the current 
system of public healthcare eligibility for children in Ireland, and current and future proposals for reform.
The purpose of this report is to examine the determinants of GP visiting behaviour among young children 
in Ireland, using data from the Infant Cohort of Growing up in Ireland. In addition to an examination of 
the impact of various factors (e.g. health, income, family composition, etc) on the patterns of GP visiting, 
the report focuses, in particular, on the impact of eligibility for free GP care. It exploits the availability of 
data from two waves of the Growing up in Ireland survey, thereby allowing the analysis to examine the 
possible impact of changes in health and other circumstances (e.g. medical card eligibility, falling household 
income, etc) on GP visiting.25  The period between the first and second waves of the Infant Cohort survey 
was one in which the Irish economy entered a severe recession and this is reflected in substantial changes 
in child and family circumstances among the Infant Cohort. For example, from the first wave of the  Infant 
Cohort in 2008 to the second wave in 2011, the proportion of children eligible for a full medical card 
increased from 26.5 per cent to 33.8 per cent. 
Core questions to be examined in this report include:
•	 Does	eligibility	for	free	GP	care	affect	children’s	use	of	GP	services?	
•	 Does	type	of	PHI	cover	affect	children’s	use	of	GP	services?	
•	 Are	user	fees	for	GP	care	a	particular	burden	on	children	from	low-income	families	without	
medical cards? Previous research on the adult population (Nolan, 2008b) found that the deterrent 
effect of user fees was also present for those at the top of the income distribution. 
•	 As	children	depend	on	their	parents	for	decision-making	in	relation	to	healthcare	use,	do	parental	
characteristics (e.g. family structure, education, employment status, etc) affect children’s use of GP 
services?
26 The Child Cohort represents 8,568 nine-year old children and their families surveyed between August 2007 and May 2008 (Murray et al., 
2011).
27 The vast majority of the missing observations occur for the household income variable. As household income is a key variable in the analyses, 
these observations are retained by including an indicator for observations with missing information on income. 
28 In most cases (99.9 per cent), the Primary Caregiver is the child’s biological mother.
29 As noted, an alternative approach is to use instrumental variables (i.e. variables associated with eligibility for free GP care, but unrelated to 
GP use). No such variables are available in the data.
30 A number of studies use regression discontinuity approaches to model the effect of insurance on healthcare use (Bauhoff et al., 2011; de 
la Mata, 2012). However, in the Irish case, the assumption of random assignment to the population above and below the cut-off (i.e. the 
income cut-offs for a full medical/GP visit card) is not satisfied in this case as a number of full medical/GP visit-card holders are granted their 
card on a discretionary basis (it is not possible to identify these individuals in the data). In addition, the means-testing system is complex, with 
numerous allowances (e.g. for childcare expenses, rent, etc), which makes it difficult to identify the precise income cut-off for full medical/GP 
visit-card eligibility (see also Callan and Keane, 2008, and Nolan and Smith, 2012).
Chapter 1 • INTRODUCTION
17
1.4 DATA
To answer these questions the report uses micro-data from Growing Up in Ireland. The survey consists of 
two cohorts of children but this report focuses on the Infant Cohort, which contains extensive details on 
11,134 nine-month-old children and their families who were surveyed between September 2008 and April 
2009 (Quail et al., 2011).26  The sampling frame was the Child Benefit Register. From January to August 
2011, the families were recontacted and 88 per cent agreed to participate in the second wave (n=9,793) of 
data collection. This study concentrates on singleton children. Non-singleton children are excluded as their 
health and GP usage patterns tend to be different from singletons, increasing the complexity of analyses. 
A small number of observations are excluded due to missing information on our variables of interest,27 
resulting in a final sample size for analysis of approximately 10,000 children for Wave 1 and 9,000 children 
for Wave 2.
GP visiting information refers to the number of GP visits in the previous 12 months, reported by the 
Primary Caregiver (the recall period is nine months for Wave 1).28  The potential for measurement error in 
a variable recorded in this way is well-recognised (Jiménez-Martín et al., 2004; Hoeck et al., 2011), although 
an analysis of self-reported data compared to data from administrative records of healthcare use in the 
Netherlands found a high degree of correlation between the two measures. More importantly, differences 
between the two measures were not related to individual characteristics such as income, education or 
occupation (Reijneveld and Stronks, 2001). On the other hand, Cleary and Jette (1984) found that reporting 
error in outpatient healthcare use in the US was associated with certain individual characteristics such as 
age and health status, although the overall magnitude of the reporting error was very small. While this is 
a potential limitation of the dependent variable, surveys of this kind are the usual source of data for the 
kinds of analyses in this report. In any case, we also analyse the probability of having at least one GP visit 
in the previous year, an indicator for which recall bias should be less of an issue than the number of visits.
Our main independent variable of interest (eligibility for free GP care) is a five-category variable reflecting 
the categories of eligibility reported in Table 1.1. As noted above, a particular concern of analyses of this 
type is to ensure that the indicator of eligibility is exogenous; i.e. that the effect of eligibility for free care 
is	not	influenced	by	the	person’s	need	for	medical	care.	Economists	refer	to	this	as	‘adverse	selection’.	If	
there is adverse selection, then the analyses of the effect of eligibility for free care are more complex as 
there is a need to disentangle the relative importance of family income and health need on GP service use.
While full medical and GP visit-card holders are eligible for free GP care by virtue of their income, a small 
proportion are eligible precisely because of poor health status. More importantly, it is possible that those 
with greater health need may purchase PHI, and particularly PHI with GP cover. Previous Irish research 
has demonstrated that adverse selection into PHI is not a feature of the Irish market (Harmon and Nolan, 
2001). However, to reduce the possibility that the eligibility effects are driven by adverse selection, we 
follow the convention used in previous literature and use a wide variety of health status measures in our 
models (Allin and Hurley, 2009).29,30 
Both waves of the GUI Infant Cohort data contain detailed information on child health, household 
socio-economic characteristics and parental health and behaviours. Independent variables are grouped 
into those reflecting need for healthcare and those related to the socio-economic characteristics of the 
household. Child health status is represented by variables indicating parental-assessed child health status, 
the child’s exposure to accidents, their birth-weight, gestation and mother’s behaviour during pregnancy 
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31 A variable indicating whether there is a GP clinic in the local area was included initially, but was insignificant in all models and therefore 
dropped from the analysis.
32 A variety of robustness checks were undertaken and are detailed in the appendices to the relevant chapters.
and in the child’s early life (smoking and breastfeeding). Household socio-economic characteristics include 
income, location and childcare arrangements, and various characteristics of the mother (age, health 
status, education, employment status, marital status and ethnicity). In common with many other studies, 
the analysis of the Wave 2 data uses lagged values of the health-status variables to overcome potential 
endogeneity and reverse causality problems, i.e. the possibility that GP use is itself a determinant of health 
status (Schellhorn et al., 2000; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2002). Most indicators are available in both waves, 
although variables relating to pregnancy and birth are collected in Wave 1 only. A full list of the dependent 
and independent variables, their definitions and sample means is provided in Table A1.1 in the Appendix 
to this chapter.
While the data contain a rich set of information relating to children’s use of healthcare services, their 
health, and the health and socio-economic characteristics of their parents, there are inevitably data 
limitations. First, it is possible that other indicators besides GP visiting are subject to recall bias (e.g. child’s 
birth-weight). Second, information on some potentially important indicators is not available. For example, 
the data do not contain variables related to the supply side of the decision to attend the GP, such as GP or 
practice characteristics.31  Third, the number of GP visits is not necessarily the only dimension of a GP visit 
that may be affected by healthcare eligibility. Unfortunately, there is no information on other aspects of 
GP visiting, such as the duration, reason for the visit, whether a follow-up visit was arranged, whether a 
prescription was received, whether a diagnostic test was ordered/carried out, etc. Such information would 
be useful as it is possible that eligibility affects not only the quantity but also the quality of visits (Barros 
et al., 2008).
1.5 METHODS
Count data econometric methodologies, which assume a skewed, discrete distribution and restrict 
predicted values to non-negative values, are usually employed in modelling healthcare use. As the Poisson 
distribution assumes that the conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance, the more flexible 
negative binomial model is generally preferred (Sarma and Simpson, 2006; Schellhorn et al., 2000). 
Extensions to the basic negative binomial specification are also possible. It has been argued that a two-
step or hurdle approach may be more appropriate in accounting for the nature of the decision-making 
process underlying the decision to visit a GP (Hurd and McGarry, 1997; Gerdtham et al., 1992; Pohlmeier 
and Ulrich, 1995; Winkelmann, 2004; Grignon et al., 2008; Zhong, 2011; Allin and Hurley, 2009; Yip and 
Berman, 2001; Gerdtham, 1997), allowing for different variables to affect the decision to visit a GP (contact 
decision) and the decision about the number of visits (frequency decision). The same variables may also 
affect the two decisions in different ways. The most common interpretation of the two-step model is in 
terms of a principal-agent framework whereby the patient initiates the visit to their GP, while the GP, 
sometimes in conjunction with the patient, decides on the frequency of treatment. However, the hurdle 
model	has	been	criticised	 for	 its	 reliance	on	the	 ‘single	 illness	 spell’	assumption	 (Jiménez-Martín	et	al.,	
2002; Santos-Silva and Windmeijer, 2001; Deb and Trivedi, 2002; Gerdtham, 1997; Vera-Hernandez, 1999), 
and for the sharp distinction that is made between users and non-users (Bago d’Uva, 2006). Deb and Trivedi 
(2002) argue that the more appropriate distinction is between high and low users, modelled using finite 
mixture models. In empirical applications, there is no clear answer as to the most appropriate technique 
to use. Previous Irish analyses have used a variety of methods and found remarkably consistent results. 
In addition, mixture models are complex to estimate, and are found to perform poorly in the absence of 
detailed longitudinal data (Bago d’Uva, 2005). For these reasons, the focus in this research report is on the 
results from the one-step and two-step hurdle negative binomial models. Model selection tests favour the 
two-step hurdle models in all cases. All models are estimated using Stata 12.1 and results are presented in 
the form of marginal effects.32 
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As noted in Section 1.3, one of the objectives of this research is to examine the burden that user fees for 
GP services place on families that are above the income thresholds for a full medical card or GP visit card. 
To this end, the same models are estimated on the sub-sample of private patients only; i.e. those without a 
full medical card or GP visit card. Previous research for adults has demonstrated that the deterrent effect of 
user fees is found at all levels of income (Nolan, 2008b); the purpose of this analysis is to examine whether 
a similar effect is evident for children. Chapter 3 focuses on this sub-sample of children.
The analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 uses cross-sectional econometric techniques to analyse these issues. 
Chapter 4 exploits the longitudinal nature of the data (i.e. the availability of two waves of data on the 
same children) to analyse (a) the impact of healthcare eligibility from a longitudinal perspective and (b) 
the impact of changes in child and family circumstances on GP visiting (e.g. loss of a full medical card). 
To undertake the latter analysis, propensity score matching methods are used. These methods are a non-
parametric estimation technique that analyses the impact of a treatment (e.g. loss of a full medical card) on 
an outcome of interest (e.g. GP visiting). Treatment and control observations are matched on observable 
characteristics (e.g. health, household income, etc), so that an estimate of the treatment effect can be 
made. As the method is non-parametric, it does not impose any functional form assumptions on the data. 
This method has previously been applied in analysing the impact of healthcare eligibility changes on GP 
visiting among the adult population in Ireland (Nolan, 2008a).
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
Chapter 2 analyses the determinants of GP visiting among children in Ireland, using Waves 1 and 2 of the 
Infant Cohort of Growing Up in Ireland. Some comparisons with other international findings are made. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the sample of private patients; i.e. children that do not have eligibility for a full 
medical or GP visit card. Chapter 4 moves on to consider the impact of changes in child and household 
circumstances (e.g. loss of a medical card, onset of an illness, decline in household income, etc) that have 
occurred since the first wave of the survey was carried out. Chapter 5 summarises the key findings and 
draws out policy implications from the analysis.
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1.7 APPENDIX
Table A1.1:  Dependent and independent variable definitions and sample statisticsa
Variable Definition Wave 1 Wave 2
Dependent variable
GP visitsb Number of GP visits since birth (Wave 1)/in the previous year (Wave 
2)
2.7 2.6
Independent variables
Public healthcare entitlements
Full medical card =1 if child has a full medical card with/without private health 
insurance (PHI)
26.4 33.8
GP visit card =1 if child has a GP visit card with/without PHI 2.8 4.5
PHI with GP cover =1 if child has no medical card or GP visit card but has PHI with full 
or partial cover for GP expenses
29.1 25.6
PHI without GP cover =1 if child has no medical card or GP visit card but has PHI without 
full or partial cover for GP expenses
23.1 20.1
No cover =1 if child has no medical card, GP visit card or PHI 18.5 16.0
Child health and early-life characteristics
Female =1 if female child 48.6 48.6
Male =1 if male child 51.4 51.4
Very healthy =1 if child is very healthy, no problems 82.8 74.6
Healthy =1 if child is healthy but a few minor problems 16.0 23.0
Ill =1 if child is sometimes quite ill/almost always unwell 1.1 2.4
No accident =1 if child has never had an accident 95.7 83.8
Accident =1 if child has ever had an accident 4.3 16.2
Birth-weight* Child birth-weight in kgs 3.5 3.5
Less than 37 weeks** =1 if child was an early delivery (36 weeks or earlier) 5.3 5.3
37-41 weeks** =1 if child was an on-time delivery (37-41 weeks) 82.6 82.6
42+ weeks** =1 if child was a late birth (42+ weeks) 12.1 12.1
No smoking** =1 if mother did not smoke during pregnancy 66.6 66.6
Smoking** =1 if mother smoked daily or occasionally during pregnancy 33.4 33.4
Breastfeeding** =1 if child was ever breastfed 43.9 43.9
No breastfeeding** =1 if child was never breastfed 56.1 56.1
Mother’s characteristics 
Age* Mother’s age in years 31.5 34.5
Excellent =1 if mother has excellent self-assessed health 30.6 30.0
Very good =1 if mother has very good self-assessed health 39.0 39.2
Good =1 if mother has good self-assessed health 23.3 23.6
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Variable Definition Wave 1 Wave 2
Fair/poor =1 if mother has fair or poor self-assessed health 7.0 7.2
Chronic =1 if mother has a chronic illness 12.0 14.7
No chronic =1 if mother does not have a chronic illness 88.0 85.3
Primary =1 if mother has no/primary education 3.6 2.1
Lower secondary =1 if mother has lower secondary education 14.0 11.8
Upper secondary =1 if mother has upper secondary education 33.2 32.6
Non-degree =1 if mother has non-degree education 19.9 21.3
Degree =1 if mother has degree education 17.6 17.8
Postgraduate =1 if mother has postgraduate education 11.6 14.3
Employed =1 if mother is employed (part-time or full-time) 52.3 42.9
Self-employed =1 if mother is self-employed 4.2 4.8
Student =1 if mother is a student 6.2 7.1
Unemployed =1 if mother is unemployed 1.6 2.5
Home duties =1 if mother is engaged in home duties 35.7 42.7
Singlec =1 if mother has never been married 27.6 23.8
Married =1 if mother is married 69.9 72.8
Separated/divorced =1 if mother is separated/divorced 2.5 3.4
White =1 if mother is of white ethnicity 94.9 95.4
Non-white =1 if mother is of non-white ethnicity 5.1 4.6
Household characteristics
Care at home =1 if child looked after by parent(s) at home 39.3 50.0
Care outside home =1 if child looked after by other(s) at home/outside home 60.7 50.0
Siblings =1 if child has siblings 57.6 79.4
No siblings =1 if child is an only child 42.4 20.6
Income 6d Missing income 7.3 5.5
Income 1d Lowest quintile of annual equivalised net income 18.3 18.7
Income 2d Second quintile of annual equivalised net income 18.5 19.0
Income 3d Third quintile of annual equivalised net income 18.4 19.3
Income 4d Fourth quintile of annual equivalised net income 20.3 18.4
Income 5d Highest quintile of annual equivalised net income 17.2 19.1
Urban =1 if household lives in an urban area 45.7 44.3
Rural =1 if household lives in a rural area 54.3 55.7
Notes: 
a  Most summary statistics refer to the proportion of the sample in that category (and figures may not add up due to rounding). For variables 
marked with an *, the summary statistic is the sample mean. For some variables, the Wave 1 information is relevant only (these variables are 
marked by **). Data are weighted. 
b		The	Wave	1	question	is:	‘Since	<baby>	was	born,	how	many	times	have	you	seen,	or	talked	on	the	telephone	with	any	of	the	following	about	
<baby’s>	physical	health?	(exclude	at	time	of	birth)’,	with	the	first	of	the	five	options	being	a	GP	or	family	physician.	The	Wave	2	question	
is:	‘In	the	past	12	months,	how	many	times	have	you	seen	or	talked	on	the	telephone	with	any	of	the	following	about	<child’s>	physical	or	
emotional health?’, with the first of the seven options being a GP. 
c  Single refers to never married, i.e. includes cohabitation.
d  Net income refers to income after deductions for tax and pay-related social insurance (PRSI). The equivalence scale used assigns a value of 1 
to the first adult, 0.66 to all others aged 14 years and over, and 0.33 to all children aged 13 years and younger.
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33 A total of 341 observations on non-singleton children were excluded. The vast majority of the missing observations occur for the household 
income variable. Due to the importance of this variable in the analysis, an indicator is included for observations with missing information on 
household income in the analyses (see also Table A1.1).
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the determinants of GP visiting among young children in Ireland, using data from 
the first and second waves of the Infant Cohort of Growing Up in Ireland . It first provides an overview 
of patterns of GP visiting among young children in Ireland, before moving on to discuss the results from 
cross-sectional models of GP visiting in each wave. Chapter 3 focuses on private patients only, i.e. children 
without a full medical or GP visit card, and examines whether lower-income private patients face particular 
barriers in accessing GP services. As noted in Chapter 1, Ireland’s system of eligibility for free GP care is 
unusual internationally; of particular concern is the high proportion of the population that must pay the 
full cost of GP care at the point of use. The analysis in Chapter 3 therefore focuses on this group, and in 
particular examines whether children from low-income families without a full medical or GP visit card face 
particular barriers in accessing GP care. Chapter 4 extends these analyses to consider GP visiting patterns 
among young children in Ireland from a longitudinal perspective; i.e. exploiting the fact that there are 
repeated measures of GP visiting (and other characteristics) for these children. This allows us to study the 
impact of changes in child and household circumstances (e.g. loss of a full medical card) on GP visiting 
patterns.
As noted in Chapter 1, 88 per cent of those surveyed in Wave 1 (at the age of nine months) were followed 
up in Wave 2 (when they were aged three years on average). Data collection for Wave 1 took place 
between September 2008 and April 2009, while data collection for Wave 2 took place between January 
and August 2011. After exclusion of non-singletons and cases with missing information on key variables, 
final sample sizes of approximately 10,000 nine-month-olds (Wave 1) and 9,000 three-year-olds (Wave 2) 
are available for analysis.33  
Section 2.2 begins the analysis of GP visiting patterns by first describing how GP visiting patterns vary 
according to various child and household characteristics. While variation in GP visiting patterns across the 
population	due	to	‘need’	factors	such	as	age	and	health	status	is	to	be	expected,	examining	the	variation,	
if	 any,	 in	 visiting	 rates	due	 to	 ‘non-need’	 factors	 (such	as	household	 income)	 is	useful	 for	highlighting	
possible horizontal inequities in GP visiting rates across different population groups. However, many of 
these factors are highly correlated with each other (for example, medical-card eligibility is highly correlated 
with household income). Section 2.3, therefore, moves on to use multivariate regression techniques, which 
will help us gain a better understanding of the independent effects of each of the different variables on 
the use of GP services. 
2.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
As noted in Chapter 1, the data on GP visiting in Growing Up in Ireland  refer to the number of GP visits 
in the last nine months (Wave 1, at the age of nine months) / last 12 months (Wave 2, at the age of three 
years), recorded by the Primary Caregiver, usually the mother. Table 2.1 illustrates that the average number 
of GP visits was 2.7 (when the children were aged nine months) and 2.6 (when aged three years). Note 
that the sample of nine-month-olds includes some children who were not present in the second wave of 
data collection, at age three. The summary statistics indicate that the data on GP visits are highly skewed, 
and the patterns in Figure 2.1 confirm this finding. For both waves, approximately 20 per cent of the 
children had no GP visit over the reference period, while less than one per cent had 20+ visits. There is 
also	some	evidence	of	‘heaping’	to	easily	recalled	numbers	(such	as	one	visit	per	month,	or	one	visit	every	
two months, etc), a phenomenon noted in many international analyses of healthcare use (McLeod, 2011; 
Bruijnzeels et al., 1998; Schellhorn, 2001). 
34 As noted in Chapter 1, the analyses distinguish between full medical-card and GP visit-card holders as the two groups differ in terms of 
prescription medicine fees (full medical-card holders pay a fixed €2.50 fee per prescription item, up to a maximum of €25 per family per month, 
while GP visit-card holders pay the full cost of prescriptions up to a deductible of €144 per family per month). See Table 1.1 for further details.
35 Mean comparison tests are carried out to check for significant differences in the average number of GP visits across the five eligibility groups.
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Table 2.1:  Number of GP visits, summary statistics
Figure 2.1:  Distribution of GP visits
Notes: Sample weights are employed. GP visits are capped at 20.
Our main independent variable of interest is eligibility for free GP care. For the purposes of analysing GP 
visiting patterns, the Irish population may be divided into five mutually exclusive categories of eligibility, 
which differ in the degree to which the patient faces user fees for GP visits (see Table 1.1). Full medical-
card and GP visit-card holders are entitled to free GP visits at the point of use,34 while those with PHI with 
cover for GP expenses face a fee for each visit that is between zero and the full cost. Those with PHI but 
without	GP	cover	and	those	with	‘no	cover’	(i.e.	without	a	full	medical	card,	GP	visit	card	or	PHI)	face	the	
full user fee at the point of use. Table A1.1 shows how the Infant Cohort children at Wave 1 and Wave 2 
were distributed across the five eligibility groups. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the differences in GP visiting patterns across the five eligibility groups. The patterns 
for both waves are consistent with expectations; the average number of GP visits per annum is highest 
for	full	medical-card	holders,	and	lowest	for	those	with	‘no	cover’.	The	differential	in	GP	visiting	between	
those	with	a	full	medical	card	and	those	with	‘no	cover’	is	slightly	higher	for	Wave	2	(i.e.	when	the	children	
were aged three years of age on average). For both waves of data, the average number of GP visits differs 
significantly between the various eligibility groups (the exception is an insignificant difference in the 
average number of GP visits between GP visit-card holders and those with PHI with some cover for GP 
expenses).35 Of course, the five groups differ considerably with respect to other characteristics (e.g. health 
status), meaning that a full multivariate analysis is necessary to unpick the independent effect of the 
various eligibility groups on GP visiting (see Section 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2:  GP visits, by public healthcare eligibility
 
Notes: Sample weights are employed. GP visits are capped at 20.
In most international analyses of GP visiting behaviour, among both adults and children, the main 
determinant of GP visiting is health need (Hoeck et al., 2011; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2004; Sarma and Simpson, 
2006; Gerdtham, 1997; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2002). Figure 2.3 illustrates the average number of GP visits 
by categories of parental-assessed child health. In international studies of adults, self-assessed health status 
has been found to be a good predictor of mortality and use of health care (Idler and Benyamini, 1997; 
Burstrom and Fredlund, 2001; van Doorslaer et al., 2000). As expected, the data indicate a clear gradient in 
GP visiting, with children in poorer health having a higher number of GP visits. For both waves of data, the 
average number of GP visits differs significantly between the various health status groups.
Figure 2.3:  GP visits, by parental-assessed child health
Notes: Sample weights are employed. GP visits are capped at 20.
A particular concern of this report is to identify horizontal inequities in GP visiting; i.e. differences in 
GP visiting patterns that are not related to need for healthcare. Apart from differences in GP visiting 
across the five eligibility groups identified above, it is important to understand the extent to which other 
characteristics of the child and family (such as mother’s education, household location, household income, 
etc) determine GP visiting patterns. Figure 2.4 presents data on GP visiting patterns by mother’s highest 
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level of education. The data reveal substantial differences. The children of mothers with lower levels of 
education have a higher number of GP visits (and the differences in GP visiting between those with the 
highest and the lowest level of education are statistically significant). There is considerable ambiguity 
about the effect of education on (adult) healthcare use. While individuals with higher levels of education 
may better understand the benefits of good health and be more willing to take preventive measures to 
secure future good health, they may also be more effective at protecting and promoting their own health 
and therefore may require less interaction with a healthcare professionals (Birch et al., 1993; McLeod, 
2011; Sarma and Simpson, 2006). The international literature suggests that the children of more educated 
mothers are more likely to have higher healthcare use, controlling for other important determinants of 
such use (Currie et al., 2008; Currie and Gruber, 1996). 
Figure 2.4:  GP visits, by mother’s highest level of education
 
Notes: Sample weights are employed. GP visits are capped at 20.
Figure 2.5 presents data on GP visiting patterns by household income quintile. As noted in Chapter 1, 
household income is adjusted to take account of household size and composition using equivalence scales, 
and a separate category for observations with missing information on household income is included in 
the analysis. Household income may reflect both the monetary and time costs of GP visiting on the part of 
the child’s parents; those with higher incomes may be better able to afford the cost of a GP visit, but may 
also face a higher opportunity cost in terms of their use of time (McLeod, 2011). The data reveal a clear 
gradient in GP visiting by household income; those on the lowest incomes have the highest number of GP 
visits, in both waves. Statistical tests reveal that the difference in GP visiting between those on the lowest 
incomes verses those on the highest incomes is statistically significant. However, as full medical-card and 
GP visit-card eligibility is largely determined on the basis of an income means test, household income is 
highly correlated with public healthcare eligibility, meaning that a full multivariate analysis is necessary to 
disentangle the independent effect of household income.
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Figure 2.5:  GP visits, by household equivalised income quintile
Notes: Sample weights are employed. GP visits are capped at 20.
2.3 MULTIVARIATE MODELS
As noted in Chapter 1, the particular form of the GP visiting variable (non-zero, integer, highly skewed) 
necessitates the use of count data econometric modelling techniques. Table 2.2 presents the results of 
the one-step negative binomial model. Column (1) presents the results for the main independent variable 
of interest, i.e. public healthcare eligibility, while column (2) adds indicators of child health need, and 
column (3) add indicators of household income and other socio-economic characteristics. Healthcare use 
is often also modelled using two-part models, in which the contact and frequency decisions are modelled 
separately. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the results of the two-part model (i.e. contact and frequency decisions, 
separately). 
Focusing first on column (1) in Table 2.2, the results confirm the patterns illustrated in Figure 2.2 – that, 
in both waves, those with a full medical card have a significantly higher number of GP visits than those 
without	a	full	medical	card,	GP	visit	card	or	PHI	(those	with	‘no	cover’).	The	relative	size	of	the	effects	is	
as expected. In Wave 1, those with a full medical card have one extra GP visit over the reference period 
compared	to	those	with	‘no	cover’,	while	the	differential	is	1.3	extra	GP	visits	in	Wave	2.	In	contrast,	the	
effect for those with PHI with no cover is smaller (0.2 extra GP visits for Wave 1, and 0.4 extra visits for 
Wave 2), but still statistically significant. However, public healthcare eligibility is highly correlated with 
other determinants of GP visiting such as child health and household income. Column (2) adds indicators 
of child health and finds that the effects for the public healthcare eligibility variables remain statistically 
significant. As expected, child health is an important determinant of GP visiting; the effects for parental-
assessed health status are particularly large and significant. Adding controls for mother and household 
characteristics in column (3) does not change the relative size and significance of the effects of public 
healthcare eligibility. In contrast to the bivariate relationships presented in Figure 2.4, mother’s education is 
never significant in determining GP visiting among young children. The effects for all independent variables 
are largely consistent across the two waves of the Growing Up in Ireland survey; notable exceptions are 
the effects for type of childcare and household income, where the negative effects of being cared for in a 
crèche or having low household income are significant only in Wave 1. On the other hand, having siblings 
is associated with a higher level of GP visiting in Wave 2 only. 
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Table 2.2: Regression results (negative binomial model)
Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Public Healthcare Eligibility
Full medical card 1.033
(0.092)***
0.921
(0.088)***
0.887
(0.094)***
1.308
(0.101)***
1.232
(0.100)***
1.082
(0.107)***
GP visit card 0.573
(0.213)***
0.467
(0.192)**
0.566
(0.196)***
0.799
(0.163)***
0.785
(0.163)***
0.799
(0.165)***
PHI with GP cover 0.392
(0.087)***
0.439
(0.083)***
0.418
(0.091)***
0.668
(0.099)***
0.680
(0.099)***
0.782
(0.103)***
PHI without GP cover 0.204
(0.092)**
0.262
(0.087)***
0.274
(0.093)***
0.387
(0.106)***
0.399
(0.105)***
0.569
(0.110)***
No cover ref ref ref ref ref ref
Child Sex
Female -0.350
(0.055)***
-0.357
(0.055)***
-0.142
(0.058)**
-0.153
(0.057)***
Male ref ref ref ref
Child Health
Very healthy ref ref ref ref
Healthy 1.667
(0.068)***
1.597
(0.069)***
0.889
(0.079)***
0.808
(0.079)***
Ill 3.563
(0.191)***
3.376
(0.195)***
2.042
(0.212)***
2.057
(0.219)***
Child Had Accident Requiring Medical Attention?
No accident ref ref ref ref
Accident 0.424
(0.130)***
0.381
(0.128)***
0.311
(0.132)**
0.262
(0.130)**
Birth-weight 0.067
(0.057)
0.083
(0.058)
-0.128
(0.062)**
-0.052
(0.062)
Gestation
Less than 37 weeks 0.340
(0.134)**
0.324
(0.134)**
0.432
(0.134)***
0.426
(0.132)***
37-41 weeks ref ref ref ref
42+ weeks 0.014
(0.089)
-0.086
(0.089)
-0.006
(0.088)
-0.103
(0.087)
Maternal Smoking
No smoking ref ref ref ref
Smoking 0.040
(0.062)
-0.023
(0.064)
-0.025
(0.064)
-0.137
(0.066)**
Was Child Breastfed?
Breastfeeding 0.235
(0.057)***
0.161
(0.060)***
0.149
(0.060)**
0.075
(0.063)
No breastfeeding ref ref ref ref
Age (of mother) -0.046
(0.007)***
-0.045
(0.007)***
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Maternal Self-Assessed Health
Excellent ref ref
Very good 0.219
(0.066)***
0.256
(0.070)***
Good 0.338
(0.077)***
0.489
(0.080)***
Fair 0.543
(0.123)***
0.531
(0.136)***
Maternal Chronic Illness
Chronic 0.211
(0.084)**
0.405
(0.088)***
No chronic ref ref
Maternal Education
Primary 0.119
(0.218)
-0.030
(0.311)
Lower secondary 0.016
(0.130)
0.143
(0.145)
Upper secondary -0.124
(0.095)
0.051
(0.096)
Non-degree -0.071
(0.093)
-0.016
(0.092)
Degree -0.091
(0.089)
0.044
(0.088)
Postgraduate ref ref
Maternal Employment Status
Employed ref ref
Self-employed 0.018
(0.125)
-0.388
(0.129)***
Student -0.294
(0.183)
0.263
(0.170)
Unemployed 0.100
(0.145)
0.093
(0.122)
Home duties 0.020
(0.077)
-0.030
(0.070)
Marital Status
Single -0.182
(0.075)**
-0.209
(0.084)**
Married ref ref
Separated/divorced 0.001
(0.165)
0.248
(0.159)
Ethnic Group
White ref ref
Non-white 0.430
(0.144)***
0.606
(0.132)***
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Childcare
Care outside home 0.226
(0.069)***
0.081
(0.063)
Care at home ref ref
Has Child Siblings?
Siblings 0.063
(0.063)
0.413
(0.073)***
No siblings ref ref
Household Income Quintile
Missing Income Group -0.423
(0.127)***
-0.152
(0.145)
Lowest Income Quintile -0.232
(0.116)**
0.045
(0.122)
2nd Income Quintile -0.239
(0.105)**
-0.210
(0.111)*
3rd Income Quintile -0.308
(0.096)***
-0.059
(0.094)
4th Income Quintile -0.253
(0.084)***
-0.061
(0.088)
Highest Income Quintile ref ref
Household Location
Urban ref ref
Rural 0.055
(0.055)
-0.105
(0.058)*
N 10,658 10,294 10,092 9,397 9,075 8,891
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
See Table A1.1 for a full description of all variables.
Analysing the decision to visit a GP using a two-step process – i.e. separating the decision to contact a GP 
from the decision of how frequently to visit – suggests that there is little difference in the effect of public 
healthcare eligibility across the two decisions (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). The exception is the effect for a GP 
visit card in Wave 1, where the results indicate that GP visit-card holders do not differ significantly from 
those	with	‘no	cover’	in	terms	of	the	probability	of	having	at	least	one	GP	visit,	but	have	a	significantly	
higher	number	of	GP	visits	to	those	with	‘no	cover’	(for	those	with	at	least	one	GP	visit).	Assuming	that	
adequate controls have been made for differences in health status and other socio-economic characteristics 
between	GP	visit-card	holders	and	 those	with	 ‘no	cover’,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	understand	why	GP	visit-card	
holders	would	not	differ	significantly	from	those	with	‘no	cover’	in	terms	of	the	probability	of	a	GP	visit.	
There is evidence from Ireland (for adults) and from other countries (Canada) that individuals consider 
the likelihood of possible prescription medicine expenses when deciding to visit their GP (Stabile, 2001; 
Fast and Williamson, 1998; Nolan and Smith, 2012; Allin and Hurley, 2009). Allin and Hurley (2009) also 
found that individuals with prescription medicine insurance in Canada made significantly more physician 
visits than those without insurance, although they found that the effect on utilisation was stronger for 
the likelihood of a visit than the conditional number of visits. The significant and negative income effect 
observed for Wave 1 in the one-step model is apparent only for the contact decision in the two-part model, 
suggesting that household income does not determine the subsequent number of GP visits among those 
children with at least one GP visit in the reference period. 
Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Public Healthcare Eligibility
Full medical card 0.081 0.076 0.086 0.119 0.118 0.120
(0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
GP visit card -0.003 0.003 0.024 0.105 0.106 0.109
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)***
PHI with GP cover 0.072 0.074 0.057 0.094 0.093 0.097
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
PHI without GP cover 0.043 0.045 0.031 0.056 0.057 0.072
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
No cover ref ref ref ref ref
Child Sex
Female -0.026 -0.024 -0.021 -0.019
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)** (0.008)**
Male ref ref ref ref
Child Health
Very healthy ref ref ref ref
Healthy 0.167 0.158 0.073 0.059
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
Ill 0.256 0.223 0.170 0.174
(0.055)*** (0.056)*** (0.050)*** (0.052)***
Child had accident requiring medical attention?
No accident ref ref ref ref
Accident 0.056 0.053 0.004 0.003
(0.021)*** (0.021)** (0.021) (0.021)
Birth-weight 0.010 0.012 -0.008 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Gestation
Less than 37 weeks 0.009 0.008 0.043 0.044
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022)* (0.022)**
38-41 weeks ref ref ref ref
42+ weeks 0.002 -0.009 0.006 -0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Maternal Smoking
No smoking ref ref ref ref
Smoking -0.008 -0.016 -0.003 -0.013
(0.009) (0.009)* (0.010) (0.010)
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Table 2.3:  Regression results (probit model, i.e. contact decision)
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Was Child Breastfed?
Breastfeeding 0.034 0.026 0.014 0.008
(0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009) (0.009)
No breastfeeding ref ref ref ref
Age (of mother) -0.004 -0.005
(0.001)*** (0.001)***
Maternal Self-Assessed Health
Excellent ref ref
Very good 0.024 0.039
(0.009)*** (0.010)***
Good 0.028 0.055
(0.011)** (0.012)***
Fair/poor 0.037 0.072
(0.019)* (0.021)***
Maternal Chronic Illness
No chronic ref ref
Chronic 0.019 0.047
(0.014) (0.014)***
Maternal Education
Primary 0.046 0.027
(0.031) (0.042)
Lower secondary 0.004 0.008
(0.019) (0.022)
Upper secondary -0.010 0.001
(0.014) (0.014)
Non-degree 0.009 0.014
(0.014) (0.014)
Degree -0.015 0.006
(0.013) (0.013)
Postgraduate ref ref
Maternal Employment Status
Employed ref ref
Self-employed 0.005 -0.036
(0.019) (0.019)*
Student -0.003 0.018
(0.030) (0.030)
Unemployed -0.002 0.037
(0.021) (0.020)*
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Home duties -0.013 0.002
(0.010) (0.010)
Marital Status
Single -0.018 -0.023
(0.011)* (0.012)*
Married ref ref
Separated/divorced 0.013 0.013
(0.023) (0.023)
Ethnic Group
White ref ref
Non-white 0.075 0.029
(0.017)*** (0.020)
Childcare
Care outside home -0.021 -0.010
(0.010)** (0.009)
Care at home ref ref
Has Child Siblings?
Siblings 0.023 0.061
(0.009)** (0.012)***
No siblings ref ref
Household Income Quintile
Missing Income Group -0.054 -0.053
(0.018)*** (0.021)**
Lowest Income Quintile -0.048 -0.040
(0.017)*** (0.018)**
2nd Income Quintile -0.040 -0.033
(0.015)*** (0.016)**
3rd Income Quintile -0.048 -0.010
(0.014)*** (0.015)
4th Income Quintile -0.027 0.000
(0.013)** (0.014)
Highest Income Quintile ref ref
Household Location
Urban ref ref
Rural 0.007 0.001
(0.008) (0.009)
N 10,658 10,294 10,092 9,397 9,075 8,891
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
See Table A1.1 for a full description of all variables.
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Table 2.4:  Regression results (truncated negative binomial model, i.e. frequency decision)
Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Public Healthcare Eligibility
Full medical card 0.923 0.881 0.802 1.119 1.080 0.902
(0.102)*** (0.105)*** (0.113)*** (0.119)*** (0.120)*** (0.129)***
GP visit card 0.729 0.618 0.637 0.557 0.563 0.584
(0.229)*** (0.223)*** (0.230)*** (0.187)*** (0.194)*** (0.199)***
PHI with GP cover 0.176 0.249 0.300 0.433 0.473 0.602
(0.099)* (0.101)** (0.111)*** (0.117)*** (0.120)*** (0.127)***
PHI without GP cover 0.054 0.130 0.210 0.227 0.250 0.421
(0.105) (0.107) (0.114)* (0.126)* (0.128)** (0.135)***
No cover ref ref ref ref ref
Child Sex
Female -0.361 -0.383 -0.093 -0.123
(0.066)*** (0.066)*** (0.066) (0.067)*
Male ref ref ref ref
Child Health
Very healthy ref ref ref ref
Healthy 1.593 1.545 0.847 0.820
(0.078)*** (0.079)*** (0.087)*** (0.088)***
Ill 3.507 3.383 1.914 1.994
(0.196)*** (0.200)*** (0.209)*** (0.221)***
Child Had an Accident Requiring Medical Attention?
No accident ref ref ref ref
Accident 0.348 0.309 0.371 0.331
(0.153)** (0.153)** (0.140)*** (0.143)**
Birth-weight 0.048 0.062 -0.129 -0.074
(0.068) (0.070) (0.071)* (0.072)
Gestation
Less than 37 weeks 0.412 0.394 0.395 0.392
(0.152)*** (0.154)** (0.148)*** (0.149)***
38-41 weeks ref ref ref ref
42+ weeks 0.013 -0.074 -0.043 -0.137
(0.108) (0.109) (0.101) (0.101)
Maternal Smoking
No smoking ref ref ref ref
Smoking 0.090 0.035 -0.028 -0.134
(0.074) (0.076) (0.073) (0.076)*
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Was Child Breastfed?
Breastfeeding 0.163 0.105 0.138 0.068
(0.068)** (0.073) (0.069)** (0.073)
No breastfeeding ref ref ref ref
Age (of mother) -0.046 -0.036
(0.008)*** (0.008)***
Maternal Self-Assessed Health
Excellent ref ref
Very good 0.194 0.169
(0.081)** (0.084)**
Good 0.343 0.418
(0.092)***  (0.094)***
Fair/poor 0.560 0.408
(0.142)*** (0.153)***
Maternal Chronic Illness
Chronic 0.201 0.355
(0.098)** (0.099)***
No chronic ref ref
Maternal Education
Primary -0.025 -0.168
(0.259) (0.364)
Lower secondary -0.001 0.148
(0.155) (0.163)
Upper secondary -0.129 0.062
(0.113) (0.112)
Non-degree -0.140 -0.078
(0.112) (0.108)
Degree -0.061 0.025
(0.106) (0.103)
Postgraduate ref ref
Maternal Employment Status
Employed ref ref
Self-employed -0.002 -0.384
(0.154) (0.154)**
Student -0.349 0.269
(0.218) (0.183)
Unemployed 0.146 -0.008
(0.168) (0.139)
Home duties 0.087 -0.052
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(2)
+ child health 
and early-life 
characteristics
(3)
+ mother and 
household 
characteristics
Marital Status
Single -0.174 -0.180
(0.089)* (0.097)*
Married ref ref
Separated/divorced -0.045 0.258
(0.199) (0.180)
Ethnic Group
White ref ref
Non-white 0.179 0.695
(0.172) (0.158)***
Childcare
Care outside home -0.221 0.151
Care at home (0.084)*** (0.073)**
ref ref
Has Child Siblings?
Siblings -0.016 0.319
(0.076) (0.083)***
No siblings ref ref
Household Income Quintile
Missing Income Group -0.344 0.023
(0.157)** (0.164)
Lowest Income Quintile -0.114 0.231
(0.139) (0.141)
2nd Income Quintile -0.151 -0.134
(0.128) (0.130)
3rd Income Quintile -0.210 -0.037
(0.117)* (0.111)
4th Income Quintile -0.240 -0.084
(0.103)** (0.105)
Highest Income Quintile ref ref
Household Location
Urban ref ref
Rural 0.036 -0.142
(0.066) (0.068)**
N 8,559 8,279 8,131 7,466 7,209 7,065
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
See Table A1.1 for a full description of all variables.
1	The	negative	binomial	model	is	‘truncated’	in	the	sense	that	the	sample	is	restricted	to	those	who	had	attended	their	GP	in	the	previous	year.
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2.4 DISCUSSION
The issue of healthcare entitlements is particularly pertinent for children given the strong causal links that 
have been demonstrated between healthcare access and child health (Currie, 1995; Currie et al., 2008; 
Currie and Gruber, 1996) and, in turn, the causal impact of child health on later health, education and 
labour market outcomes (Case et al., 2005). The results indicate that there is a significant relationship 
between eligibility for free GP care and GP visiting among children in Ireland; that the effects are consistent 
with the differing relative prices facing the various eligibility groups (e.g. full medical-card holders have 
a significantly higher number of GP visits than those who must pay the full price of GP care); that the 
effects are very similar for the two waves of data examined, and that the effects are consistent with 
previous analyses on the adult population in Ireland. These results highlight the importance of the financial 
incentives embodied in the Irish system of eligibility for free GP care in influencing GP visiting behaviour 
among children. 
As noted, the Irish system of public healthcare eligibility is unusual internationally. The results of the 
econometric models confirm the important role that public healthcare eligibility plays in explaining 
differences in GP visiting rates across the population. Of particular concern in the Irish context is the extent 
to which non-need factors such as household income determine GP visiting rates, and whether this differs 
in comparison with other countries with free access to GP services at the point of use. Layte and Nolan 
(2014) have compared the findings from the second wave of the Infant Cohort of Growing Up in Ireland 
with data from the Growing up in Scotland survey. They found that overall GP visiting rates were higher 
in Ireland than in Scotland and that the variation in GP visiting rates between those on the lowest and 
highest household incomes was greater among the children in Ireland. No evidence of a significant income 
gradient in GP visiting was found among the Scottish children, whereas Layte and Nolan (2014) found that 
Irish children from higher-income families were significantly more likely to visit their GP at least once in a 
12-month period. Patterns such as these raise concerns over the extent to which the Irish system of public 
healthcare eligibility is ensuring access to GP services on the basis of need, rather than ability to pay. The 
following chapter focuses in particular on the sub-sample of children in Ireland who face the full cost of 
GP care at the point of use, and examines the extent to which barriers to access are evident for those on 
low incomes.
While the analysis in this chapter highlights the association between eligibility for free GP care and GP 
visiting among children in Ireland, it cannot draw any conclusions about the causal mechanisms involved, 
nor about the possible impact of the system on child health. However, the availability of two waves of 
the Infant Cohort data from Growing Up in Ireland allows us to extend the analysis in this chapter to 
investigate the causal mechanisms, by analysing the extent to which changes in public healthcare eligibility 
lead to changes in GP visiting (in Chapter 4). Analysing the impact of the particular Irish system of public 
healthcare eligibility on child health requires data collection over a much longer timeframe than that 
currently available. 
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GP VISITING PATTERNS 
(PRIVATE SAMPLE)
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
As discussed in Chapter 1, a substantial proportion of the Irish population must pay the full cost of GP care 
at the point of use (although some may be eligible for full or partial reimbursement of the cost through 
their particular PHI plan). While most of the empirical work has concentrated on comparing the behaviour 
of medical-card (full medical and GP visit card) and private patients, there has been relatively little analysis 
of the role of income in determining differences in GP visiting among private patients. 
The current net weekly income threshold for a GP visit card is €514 for a family of two adults and two 
children under the age of 16 years (HSE, 2015). An average GP fee of €50 for one family member, therefore, 
amounts to nearly 10 per cent of net weekly family income for a family just above this income threshold, 
a significant outlay before any associated prescription-medicine costs are taken into account. There are, 
therefore, real concerns that those on low (but not the lowest) incomes face particular hardship in accessing 
GP services. Indeed, a study of adults found that private patients with low or middle incomes in Ireland 
were four times more likely to forgo a GP consultation due to cost than private patients on higher incomes 
(and that no such disincentive existed in Northern Ireland, with free GP visits for all at the point of use 
under the UK NHS) (O’Reilly et al., 2007). Previous research on the adult population found little evidence of 
a significant income gradient in GP visiting among private patients over the period 1987 to 2001 in Ireland 
(Nolan, 2008b), although early research on the first wave of the Infant and Child Cohorts of Growing 
Up in Ireland found some evidence that nine-month-old children from higher-income families without a 
medical or GP visit card had a significantly higher number of GP visits than those on lower incomes without 
a medical or GP visit card (no significant income gradient was found for the nine-year-old children) (Layte 
and Nolan, 2014). 
This	chapter	focuses	on	this	segment	of	the	population	(i.e.	 ‘private’	patients).	 In	particular,	 it	 seeks	to	
examine whether user fees for GP care are a particular burden on children from low-income families 
without full medical or GP visit cards; i.e. whether there is a significant income effect in GP visiting, even 
after adjusting for health need and other determinants of GP visiting. If the cost of a GP consultation is 
indeed a substantial burden for private patients just above the income threshold for a GP visit card, it 
would be expected that GP visiting increases as one moves further up the income distribution, adjusting 
for all other influences on GP visiting such as health status. The analyses in this chapter are conducted on 
the 7,553 children in Wave 1 and the 5,984 children in Wave 2 without a full medical or GP visit card. The 
following section presents an overview of GP visiting patterns for this group of patients, while Section 3.3 
presents and discusses the results of multivariate regression models of GP visiting. Section 3.4 draws out 
the policy implications from this chapter.
3.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 3.1 shows that the average number of GP visits among private patients was 2.4 when the children 
were aged nine months and 2.2 when they were aged three years. As with the data on the full sample 
presented in Chapter 2, the summary statistics indicate that the data on GP visits are highly skewed. The 
patterns in Figure 3.1 confirm this finding. For both waves, just over 20 per cent of the children had no GP 
visit in the reference period, while less than 0.5 per cent had 20+ visits in the last year. Again, there is also 
some	evidence	of	‘heaping’	to	easily	recalled	numbers	(such	as	one	visit	per	month,	or	one	visit	every	two	
months, etc). 
36 Mean comparison tests are carried out to check for significant differences in the average number of GP visits across the three eligibility 
groups (PHI with GP cover, PHI without GP cover, no cover) examined in this chapter.
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Table 3.1:  Number of GP visits, private patients, summary statistics
Notes:  GP visits are capped at 20. The recall period is 9 months for Wave 1 and 12 months for Wave 2. Sample weights are employed.
Figure 3.1:  Distribution of GP visits, private patients
Notes: Sample weights are employed. GP visits are capped at 20.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the differences in GP visiting patterns across the three groups of private patients that 
may	be	identified	(i.e.	PHI	with	GP	cover,	PHI	without	GP	cover,	and	‘no	cover’).	The	patterns	for	both	waves	
are consistent with expectations; the average number of GP visits is highest for those with PHI with GP 
cover,	and	lowest	for	those	with	‘no	cover’.	The	differential	in	GP	visiting	between	those	with	PHI	with	GP	
cover	and	those	with	‘no	cover’	is	more	marked	for	Wave	2	(i.e.	when	the	children	were	aged	three	years	
of age on average). For both waves of data, the average number of GP visits differs significantly between 
the three groups of private patients.36 
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Figure 3.2:  GP visits, by public healthcare eligibility, private sample
 Notes: Sample weights are employed. GP visits are capped at 20.
Figure 3.3 presents the bivariate relationship between household equivalised income quintile (redefined 
for	this	sample)	and	GP	visiting	for	those	who	must	pay	for	GP	care	(i.e.	‘private’	patients).	The	data	show	
that GP visiting rates are significantly higher among those in the highest income quintile than those in the 
lower income quintiles (although the difference in GP visiting is less significant for Wave 2). While a full 
multivariate analysis is needed to confirm these findings, patterns such as this are a concern as they suggest 
that those on lower incomes, without access to free GP care via a full medical card or GP visit card, face 
particular barriers to accessing GP care.
Figure 3.3:  GP visits, by household equivalised income, private sample
Notes: Sample weights are employed. GP visits are capped at 20.
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37 On the other hand, it is possible that those on lower incomes without a medical or GP visit card may visit their GP to receive care for 
conditions while on a waiting list for secondary care for that condition.
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3.3 MULTIVARIATE MODELS
Turning to the multivariate analysis using a one-step model in Table 3.2, it can be seen that, consistent with 
the patterns presented in Figure 3.1, household income is a significant determinant of GP visiting behaviour 
among children without access to free GP care at the point of use. However, once all other controls have 
been added to the model, this effect remains significant for Wave 1 only. As noted above, patterns such as 
these are a concern as they suggest that children from lower-income families face barriers to accessing GP 
care. The results for public healthcare eligibility are as expected, as they suggest that, compared with those 
with	‘no	cover’	(i.e.	who	face	the	full	cost	of	GP	care	at	the	point	of	use),	those	with	PHI	that	provides	full	
or partial cover for GP expenses have a significantly higher number of GP visits. Even those with PHI with 
no	cover	for	GP	expenses	have	a	significantly	higher	number	of	GP	visits	than	those	with	‘no	cover’,	despite	
the fact that both groups face the same cost for GP care. It is not possible to give a definitive explanation 
for this finding, but there would seem to be at least three alternatives. First, this effect may be a proxy for 
the higher incomes and other resources of families with PHI which is not already measured in the income 
variable used. Second, the purchase of PHI, conditional on income, may be an indirect measure of a greater 
propensity to consult the GP since it could indicate risk-adverse behaviour (i.e. the purchase of insurance). 
Third, the higher rate of GP attendance may reflect the better availability of referral to secondary care 
experienced by this group; those without the ability to move quickly to secondary care may hesitate to 
have medical conditions assessed.37  
Consistent with the results for the full sample presented in Chapter 2, child health is an important 
determinant of GP visiting behaviour for the private sample, as are mother’s characteristics such as ethnicity 
and health. The results for the two-step model in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 suggest that the significant negative 
effect of lower household income in Wave 1 applies only to the contact decision; household income has 
no significant effect on the frequency of GP visiting among those who must pay (some or all of) the full 
price of GP care. 
Table 3.2: Regression results (negative binomial model, private sample)
Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Household Income Quintile
Lowest Income Quintile -0.335 -0.231 -0.242 -0.286 -0.069 -0.181
(0.099)*** (0.107)** (0.110)** (0.107)*** (0.112) (0.117)
2nd Income Quintile -0.294 -0.237 -0.261 -0.299 -0.152 -0.208
(0.099)*** (0.102)** (0.101)*** (0.096)*** (0.099) (0.102)**
3rd Income Quintile -0.394 -0.366 -0.346 -0.191 -0.102 -0.122
(0.100)*** (0.101)*** (0.097)*** (0.099)* (0.100) (0.101)
4th Income Quintile -0.094 -0.090 -0.159 -0.149 -0.118 -0.188
(0.093) (0.093) (0.091)* (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)**
Highest Income Quintile ref ref ref ref ref ref
Missing Income Group -0.521 -0.468 -0.482 -0.166 -0.077 -0.183
(0.133)*** (0.135)*** (0.134)*** (0.151) (0.155) (0.156)
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Public Healthcare Eligibility
PHI with GP cover 0.297 0.349 0.566 0.654
(0.085)*** (0.085)*** (0.090)*** (0.093)***
PHI without GP cover 0.122 0.212 0.325 0.466
(0.089) (0.087)** (0.096)*** (0.098)***
No cover ref ref ref ref
Child Sex
Female -0.301 0.010
(0.059)*** (0.063)
Male ref ref
Child Health
Very healthy ref ref
Healthy 1.531 0.706
(0.075)*** (0.086)***
Ill 2.941 1.759
(0.270)*** (0.275)***
Child Had Accident Requiring Medical Attention?
No accident ref ref
Accident 0.409 0.293
(0.141)*** (0.140)**
Birth-weight 0.046 -0.066
(0.063) (0.070)
Gestation
Less than 37 weeks 0.486 0.344
(0.145)*** (0.161)**
38-41 weeks ref ref
42+ weeks -0.095 -0.167
(0.102) (0.093)*
Maternal Smoking
No smoking ref ref
Smoking 0.086 -0.130
(0.071) (0.077)*
Was Child Breastfed?
Breastfeeding 0.121 0.029
(0.065)* (0.070)
No breastfeeding ref ref
Age (of mother) -0.041 -0.054
(0.008)*** (0.009)***
Chapter 3 • GP VISITING PATTERNS (PRIVATE SAMPLE)
45
Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Maternal Self-Assessed Health
Excellent ref ref
Very good 0.211 0.200
(0.068)*** (0.074)***
Good 0.300 0.401
(0.084)*** (0.089)***
Fair/poor 0.463 0.475
(0.152)*** (0.183)***
Maternal Chronic Illness
No chronic ref ref
Chronic 0.202 0.290
(0.095)** (0.100)***
Maternal Education
Primary -0.340 0.310
(0.396) (0.597)
Lower secondary -0.040 0.153
(0.168) (0.233)
Upper secondary -0.141 0.006
(0.097) (0.106)
Non-degree -0.078 -0.019
(0.091) (0.093)
Degree -0.085 0.040
(0.085) (0.084)
Postgraduate ref ref
Maternal Employment Status
Employed ref ref
Self-employed 0.063 -0.462
(0.120) (0.123)***
Student -0.148 0.298
(0.332) (0.401)
Unemployed 0.323 0.359
(0.187)* (0.172)**
Home duties 0.056 -0.072
(0.084) (0.075)
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Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Marital Status
Single -0.203 -0.289
(0.086)** (0.108)***
Married ref ref
Separated/divorced -0.289 0.155
(0.215) (0.238)
Ethnic Group
White ref ref
Non-white 0.938 1.116
(0.179)*** (0.174)***
Childcare
Care outside home 0.230 0.128
(0.071)*** (0.066)*
Care at home ref ref
Has Child Siblings?
Siblings 0.039 0.328
(0.067) (0.082)***
No siblings ref ref
Household Location
Urban ref ref
Rural 0.042 0.060
(0.060) (0.065)
N 7,553 7,499 7,190 5,984 5,950 5,683
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Table 3.3:  Regression results (probit model, private sample – contact decision)
Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Marital Status
Lowest Income Quintile -0.076 -0.054 -0.047 -0.076 -0.042 -0.058
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)** (0.020)***
2nd Income Quintile -0.073 -0.060 -0.053 -0.043 -0.018 -0.026
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)** (0.018) (0.019)
3rd Income Quintile -0.078 -0.071 -0.068 -0.024 -0.010 -0.012
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
4th Income Quintile -0.007 -0.004 -0.012 -0.017 -0.013 -0.021
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Highest Income Quintile ref ref ref ref ref ref
Missing Income Group -0.082 -0.070 -0.066 -0.054 -0.039 -0.051
(0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)*** (0.026)** (0.026) (0.027)*
Public Healthcare Eligibility
PHI with GP cover 0.057 0.059 0.088 0.097
(0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)***
PHI without GP cover 0.028 0.032 0.051 0.072
(0.013)** (0.013)** (0.014)*** (0.016)***
No cover ref ref ref
Child Sex
Female -0.028 -0.006
(0.009)*** (0.011)
Male ref ref
Child Health
Very healthy ref ref
Healthy 0.169 0.069
(0.016)*** (0.016)***
Ill 0.191 0.109
(0.068)*** (0.068)
Child Had Accident Requiring Medical Attention?
No accident ref ref
Accident 0.044 0.023
(0.025)* (0.029)
Birth-weight 0.008 -0.008
(0.010) (0.012)
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Gestation
Less than 37 weeks 0.019 -0.007
(0.025) (0.029)
38-41 weeks ref ref
42+ weeks -0.001 0.016
(0.015) (0.018)
Maternal Smoking
No smoking ref ref
Smoking -0.020 -0.014
(0.011)* (0.013)
Was Child Breastfed?
Breastfeeding 0.026 0.011
(0.010)** (0.012)
No breastfeeding ref ref
Age (of mother) -0.005 -0.008
(0.001)*** (0.001)***
Maternal Self-Assessed Health
Excellent ref ref
Very good 0.029 0.042
(0.011)*** (0.012)***
Good 0.022 0.056
(0.013) (0.016)***
Fair/poor 0.042 0.055
(0.025)* (0.031)*
Maternal Chronic Illness
No chronic ref ref
Chronic 0.031 0.062
(0.017)* (0.019)***
Maternal Education
Primary 0.031 0.213
(0.068) (0.150)
Lower secondary 0.036 0.025
(0.027) (0.040)
Upper secondary -0.024 -0.011
(0.016) (0.018)
Non-degree 0.002 0.008
(0.016) (0.017)
Degree -0.023 0.006
(0.015) (0.015)
Postgraduate ref ref
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Maternal Employment Status
Employed ref ref
Self-employed 0.007 -0.041
(0.020) (0.021)*
Student 0.078 -0.003
(0.066) (0.059)
Unemployed -0.001 0.057
(0.030) (0.031)*
Home duties 0.005 0.001
(0.013) (0.013)
Marital Status
Single -0.028 -0.046
(0.013)** (0.018)**
Married ref ref
Separated/divorced -0.028 0.015
(0.032) (0.040)
Ethnic Group
White ref ref
Non-white 0.084 0.069
(0.024)*** (0.030)**
Childcare
Care outside home 0.032 0.001
(0.011)*** (0.012)
Care at home ref ref
Has Child Siblings?
No siblings ref ref
Siblings 0.015 0.073
(0.011) (0.016)***
Household Location
Urban ref ref
Rural 0.005 0.019
(0.010) (0.011)*
N 7,553 7,499 7,190 5,984 5,950 5,683
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 3.4:    Regression results (truncated negative binomial model, private sample – frequency decision)
Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Household Income Quintile
Lowest Income Quintile -0.142 -0.102 -0.156 -0.082 0.069 -0.027
(0.112) (0.121) (0.133) (0.120) (0.126) (0.137)
2nd Income Quintile -0.107 -0.084 -0.159 -0.234 -0.136 -0.194
(0.112) (0.114) (0.123) (0.106)** (0.110) (0.120)
3rd Income Quintile -0.209 -0.203 -0.209 -0.163 -0.099 -0.128
(0.113)* (0.114)* (0.117)* (0.111) (0.112) (0.120)
4th Income Quintile -0.097 -0.104 -0.180 -0.134 -0.110 -0.185
(0.106) (0.106) (0.112) (0.102) (0.102) (0.107)*
5th Income Quintile ref ref ref ref ref ref
Missing Income Group -0.359 -0.339 -0.411 -0.021 0.041 -0.055
(0.153)** (0.156)** (0.166)** (0.164) (0.169) (0.177)
Public Healthcare Eligibility
PHI with GP cover 0.143 0.221 0.393 0.496
(0.095) (0.104)** (0.105)*** (0.112)***
PHI without GP cover 0.027 0.139 0.209 0.331
(0.100) (0.106) (0.111)* (0.118)***
No cover ref ref ref
Child Sex
Female -0.306 0.037
(0.072)*** (0.074)
Male ref ref
Child Health
Very healthy ref ref
Healthy 1.489 0.694
(0.086)*** (0.096)***
Ill 2.991 1.803
(0.274)*** (0.262)***
Child Had Accident Requiring Medical Attention?
No accident ref ref
Accident 0.382 0.321
(0.167)** (0.155)**
Birth-weight 0.025 -0.057
(0.077) (0.082)
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Gestation
Less than 37 weeks 0.566 0.468
(0.164)*** (0.174)***
38-41 weeks ref ref
42+ weeks -0.121 -0.285
(0.128) (0.112)**
Maternal Smoking
No smoking ref ref
Smoking 0.204 -0.135
(0.086)** (0.090)
Was Child Breastfed?
Breastfeeding 0.060 0.004
(0.079) (0.082)
No breastfeeding ref ref
Age (of mother) -0.036 -0.040
(0.009)*** (0.010)***
Maternal Self-Assessed Health
Excellent ref ref
Very good 0.177 0.108
(0.084)** (0.088)
Good 0.328 0.321
(0.101)*** (0.104)***
Fair/poor 0.462 0.414
(0.179)*** (0.204)**
Maternal Chronic Illness
No chronic ref ref
Chronic 0.149 0.193
(0.111) (0.116)*
Maternal Education
Primary -0.650 -0.085
(0.512) (0.811)
Lower secondary -0.216 0.119
(0.213) (0.273)
Upper secondary -0.095 0.051
(0.117) (0.124)
Non-degree -0.116 -0.055
(0.110) (0.109)
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Wave 1 (average age 9 months) Wave 2 (average age 3 years)
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
(1)
Household 
income
(2)
+ public 
healthcare 
entitlements
(3)
+ child health, 
early-life, 
mother and 
household 
characteristics
Degree -0.030 0.021
(0.102) (0.097)
Postgraduate ref ref
Maternal Employment Status
Employed ref ref
Self-employed 0.056 -0.483
(0.145) (0.150)***
Student -0.460 0.389
(0.442) (0.424)
Unemployed 0.453 0.265
(0.209)** (0.195)
Home duties 0.055 -0.093
(0.103) (0.089)
Marital Status
Single -0.171 -0.211
(0.103)* (0.125)*
Married ref ref
Separated/divorced -0.275 0.181
(0.259) (0.279)
Ethnic Group
White ref ref
Non-white 0.919 1.308
(0.228)*** (0.222)***
Childcare
Care outside home 0.184 0.170
(0.087)** (0.077)**
Care at home ref ref
Has Child Siblings?
Siblings -0.014 0.200
(0.082) (0.095)**
No siblings ref ref
Household Location
Urban ref ref
Rural 0.029 0.005
(0.073) (0.075)
N 5,995 5,959 5,728 4,620 4,596 4,389
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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3.4 DISCUSSION
This chapter has focused on the subsample of private patients only (i.e. those without a full medical card or 
GP visit card). Previous research on the adult population has found little evidence of a significant income 
gradient in GP visiting among private patients over the period 1987 to 2001 (Nolan, 2008b), although early 
research on the private samples from the first wave of the Infant and Child Cohorts of Growing Up in 
Ireland found some evidence that nine-month-old  children from higher-income families had a significantly 
higher number of GP visits than those on lower incomes (no significant income gradient was found for 
the nine-year-old children) (Layte and Nolan, 2014). Using data from the first and second waves of the 
Infant Cohort, the analysis in this chapter found that, even after controlling for health status and other 
socio-economic characteristics, children from higher-income families had a significantly higher number of 
GP visits than those from lower-income families, although these effects are larger and more significant in 
Wave 1. This finding is a concern as it indicates the existence of income-related inequity in terms of access 
to GP services among children in Ireland with a full medical or GP visit card. 
The lack of significant effects for the income variables on GP visiting among private patients in Wave 2 
may be explained by the timing of the data collection for the two waves. The Wave 1 data were collected 
between September 2008 and April 2009 when the recession was just beginning, while the Wave 2 data 
were collected between January and August 2011, when the recession was in its fourth year. In Wave 1, 
70.8 per cent of the sample consisted of private patients, while the corresponding proportion in Wave 2 
was 61.8 per cent. It is, therefore, possible that enhanced access to the full medical and GP visit cards (as a 
result of falling household incomes and increased unemployment) during this period resulted in those who 
had previously faced particular barriers in accessing GP services becoming eligible for free GP care. Chapter 
4 examines this issue, taking into account the longitudinal nature of the data, and the impact of transitions 
into and out of full medical- and GP visit-card eligibility on GP visiting patterns.
These patterns of GP visiting do not tell us anything about the extent to which patients are using alternative 
services that may act as a substitute for GP care. GPs act as gatekeepers for secondary care in Ireland, but 
it is possible that those on higher incomes may also be able to bypass the GP for ongoing care and use 
private outpatient care instead. One of the largest private insurers (VHI Healthcare) operates a number 
of outpatient clinics that provide GP-like services to subscribers (albeit for a fee that is in excess of the 
average GP fee), and which have considerably longer opening hours (from 8am-10pm seven days a week). 
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to separately examine the use of outpatient services, but it is 
possible that this type of behaviour could explain the insignificance of income in Wave 2 (particularly for 
the frequency decision if higher-income individuals use the GP for a referral to private outpatient care).
  
On	the	other	hand,	previous	research	on	the	adult	population	has	shown	that	private	patients	with	‘no	
cover’ were significantly more likely to self-refer to emergency department (ED) services, but less likely to 
be admitted to hospital than all other eligibility groups, suggesting use of ED services by this group for 
non-urgent reasons (Smith, 2007). While the current charge for private patients who access ED services 
without a GP referral is €100 (substantially above the average GP charge of €50), collection of the ED 
charge for private patients has traditionally been poor, and the ED charge is not as well understood as the 
GP charge (Smith, 2007). This phenomenon, if it is relevant for children, could explain the income gradient 
in GP visiting that was observed for Wave 1, all else being equal.
What do these results imply for current health policy in Ireland? As noted in Chapter 1, the current 
Programme for Government contains a commitment to extend free GP care to all children under 18 years 
of age (Government of Ireland, 2016), and free GP care has already been extended to all under-sixes since 
2015. Prior to the economic crisis, government policy was focused on increasing the income thresholds for a 
full	medical	card.	The	substantial	increase	in	income	thresholds	as	well	as	the	introduction	of	the	‘GP	only’	
medical card in October 2005 (with income thresholds 50 per cent higher than for the full medical card) 
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Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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were consistent with this policy focus. However, the results (for Wave 1) suggest that, while the deterrent 
effect of GP user fees is most apparent for those just above the income threshold for a GP visit card, all 
private patients have significantly lower levels of GP visiting than full medical- or GP visit-card holders, 
even after adjusting for differences in health need and other socio-economic characteristics across the 
various eligibility groups. While it is difficult to determine the extent to which full medical- or GP visit-
card	holders	may	be	‘over-consuming’	GP	services,	or	private	patients	‘under-consuming’	GP	services	(with	
potentially negative effects on future healthcare use and health), previous research from other settings 
has	highlighted	the	negative	effects	of	user	fees	on	healthcare	access;	i.e.	user	fees	deter	both	‘necessary’	
as	well	as	 ‘unnecessary’	 care	 (Manning	et	al.,	 1987;	Newhouse	and	 Insurance	Experiment	Group,	1993;	
Chernew and Newhouse, 2008; Robinson, 2002). In this context, large differences in GP visiting behaviour 
between different segments of the population and among private patients on different incomes are a 
concern, as they suggest that, for private patients, access is granted partly on the basis of ability to pay.
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Chapter 4
GP VISITING PATTERNS 
(LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS)
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38 The data used in Nolan (2008a) covered the period 1995-2001, before the introduction of the GP visit card and the introduction of PHI plans 
with full or partial cover for GP expenses.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
As noted in Chapter 1, one of the main objectives of this report is to exploit the availability of data 
from two waves of the Growing Up in Ireland survey to further examine the impact of public healthcare 
eligibility on GP use. Longitudinal data offer a number of advantages over a single cross-section. First, they 
allow us to overcome the problem of simultaneity between healthcare use and health status that exists 
in cross-sectional analyses of healthcare use (Bago d’Uva, 2005). Second, one of the main disadvantages 
of cross-sectional analysis is the possibility that a significant association between two variables may be 
spurious, that is, due to differences between individuals on some unmeasured factor. With longitudinal 
data, the availability of repeated measures on the same individual allows us to adjust the standard errors for 
clustering at the individual level, and thus control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (characteristics 
of the individual that are time-invariant, such as genetic endowments, attitudes towards risk, etc). Given 
the reduced time span of the panel, in this case just two waves, two waves of data are pooled (an approach 
also used by Jiménez-Martín et al., 2002, and Jiménez-Martín et al., 2004), and adjustment is made to the 
standard errors to account for the availability of up to two observations per child. 
Third, and most importantly, longitudinal data allow us to examine the causal impact of public healthcare 
eligibility, health and other variables on GP visiting by examining the impact of changes in these variables 
on GP visiting rates between waves. Ideally, data from more than two waves would be used to identify 
causal effects, but even with two waves of data, an attempt can be made to draw out some initial findings. 
The period between the first and second waves of the Growing Up in Ireland Infant Cohort survey was 
one in which the Irish economy entered a severe recession, and this is reflected in substantial changes in 
child and family circumstances among the Infant Cohort. For example, from the first wave of the Infant 
Cohort in 2008/2009 to the second wave in 2011, full medical-card cover increased from 26.4 per cent to 
33.8 per cent (see Table A1.1). The analysis in this chapter uses propensity score matching methods which, 
in combination with longitudinal data, allow the researcher to determine the causal impact of a treatment 
(e.g. gaining a medical card) on an outcome of interest (e.g. GP use). Unfortunately, two waves of data do 
not provide a sufficiently long observation period to examine the impact of eligibility on child health, but 
this crucial question will be examined as further waves of the Infant Cohort become available.
Previous analyses of longitudinal data on GP visiting patterns among adults in Ireland have confirmed 
the findings from cross-sectional research (Nolan, 2007). Nolan (2008a) examined the impact of gaining 
or losing a full medical card, using eight waves of data on adults from the Living in Ireland study over the 
period 1995-2001. The research showed that, controlling for all other changes in circumstances (e.g. health 
status), gaining a full medical card led to a significant increase in GP visits (per annum) of between 0.9 
and 1.3, while losing a full medical card led to a significant decline in annual GP visits of between 1.1 and 
1.6. The research concluded that the change in the number of GP visits was larger and more significant 
for those losing a full medical card than for those gaining a medical card, suggesting an asymmetry in the 
effects; i.e. that the deterrent effect of charging for GP visits (for those who lost a full medical card) was 
greater than the incentive effect of free GP visits (for those who gained a full medical card).38  To find out 
to what extent this finding also holds for GP visiting by children is one of the objectives of the analysis in 
this chapter.
This chapter first presents some descriptive statistics on the sample in the two waves; e.g. outlining how 
certain characteristics have changed over time (such as medical-card eligibility) (Section 4.2). The robustness 
of the cross-sectional results outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 are then checked by repeating the analyses, but 
this time accounting for the longitudinal nature of the data (Section 4.3). Our central question is: do the 
cross-sectional findings hold when adjustment is made for the availability of two observations on the same 
child? Section 4.4 considers the impact of changes in public healthcare eligibility on GP visiting, while 
Section 4.5 discusses the findings. 
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4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Before describing the modelling approach and empirical results, it is useful to outline how the characteristics 
of the children and their families changed over the period between Wave 1 and Wave 2. This section 
focuses on the children surveyed in both Wave 1 and Wave 2, i.e. the balanced sample. Figure 4.1 shows 
that, while the majority of children in each public healthcare eligibility category in Wave 1 remained in the 
same category in Wave 2, there was also considerable movement between the categories. For example, the 
sharp rise in the numbers eligible for full medical-card eligibility is reflected in the fact that 48.9 per cent 
of	those	with	a	GP	visit	card	in	Wave	1	and	30.7	per	cent	of	those	with	‘no	cover’	in	Wave	1	had	become	
eligible for a full medical card by Wave 2.
Figure 4.1:  Changes in public healthcare eligibility, Wave 1 to Wave 2
Note: The data are interpreted as follows: 85.6 per cent of those with a full medical card in Wave 1 had a full medical card in Wave 2; 5.6 per 
cent moved to a GP visit card; 1.8 per cent moved to PHI with GP cover; 1.5 per cent moved to PHI with no GP cover, and 5.5 per cent moved to 
‘no	cover’.	Totals	add	to	100.	
See Table A4.1 in the Appendix to this chapter for the exact number of children accounted for by each transition.
In terms of household equivalised income, the data in Figure 4.2 indicate that there was considerable 
stability in relative household income position for those at the very top and the very bottom of the income 
distribution. For example, over 50 per cent of those in the lowest income quintile in Wave 1 remained in 
the lowest income quintile in Wave 2, and over 65 per cent of those in the highest income quintile in Wave 
1 remained in the highest income quintile in Wave 2. Among the middle-income quintiles, there is more 
volatility (as expected, since observations can move up or down the distribution), although the majority of 
observations remain in the same income quintile between waves (approximately one-third remain in the 
same income quintile in Wave 2).
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Figure 4.2:  Changes in household equivalised income quintile, Wave 1 to Wave 2
Note: The data are interpreted as follows: 54.4 per cent of those in income quintile 1 (the lowest income quintile) in Wave 1 remained in the 
lowest income quintile in Wave 2; 29.8 per cent moved to the second income quintile; 10.9 per cent moved to the third income quintile; 2.8 per 
cent moved to the fourth income quintile, and 2.1 per cent moved to income quintile 5 (the highest income quintile). Totals add to 100.
 
Figure	4.3	shows	that	only	20	per	cent	of	children	reported	to	be	‘ill’	in	Wave	1	were	still	in	that	category	
in	Wave	2,	and	over	a	third	had	transitioned	to	a	state	of	being	‘very	healthy’.	A	similar	positive	trend	is	
evident for exposure to accidents; the majority of children who had experienced an accident in Wave 1 
reported no accident at Wave 2 (see Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.3:  Changes in parental-assessed child health status, Wave 1 to Wave 2
Note:	The	data	are	interpreted	as	follows:	79.3	per	cent	of	children	who	were	classified	as	‘very	healthy’	at	Wave	1	were	also	classified	as	‘very	
healthy’	at	Wave	2,	19.3	per	cent	moved	to	the	‘healthy’	category,	and	just	1.4	transitioned	to	the	‘ill’	category	at	Wave	2.
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Figure 4.4:  Changes in accidents, Wave 1 to Wave 2
Note: The data are interpreted as follows: 85.1 per cent of children who had no accidents at Wave 1 also had no accidents at Wave 2, while 
14.9 per cent reported at least one accident in Wave 2.
In terms of GP visits, it is difficult to make accurate comparisons of changes as the recall period is different 
for the two waves. However, the data indicate that there was considerable mobility in GP visiting, with 
over two-thirds of those with no GP visit in Wave 1 having at least one GP visit in Wave 2, and 17.3 per cent 
of those with at least one GP visit in Wave 1 having no GP visits in Wave 2.
Figure 4.5:  Change in GP visits (proportion with at least one GP visit), Wave 1 to Wave 2
Note: The data are interpreted as follows: 33.9 per cent of children who had no GP visit at Wave 1 also had no GP visit at Wave 2, while 66.1 
per cent reported at least one GP visit in Wave 2.
Section 4.3 uses techniques from the treatment effects literature to evaluate the extent to which the 
changes in public healthcare eligibility observed in Figure 4.1 led to significant changes in GP visiting 
between waves.
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 4.3 MULTIVARIATE LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS
As noted, longitudinal data analysis offers a number of advantages over cross-sectional analysis. In 
particular, the availability of repeated measures on the same individual allows us to adjust the standard 
errors for clustering at the individual level, and to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (i.e. 
characteristics of the individual that are time-invariant). Given the reduced time span of the panel, in this 
case just two waves, the two waves of data are pooled (an approach also used by Jiménez-Martín et al. 
(2002) and Jiménez-Martín et al. (2004), and adjustment is made to the standard errors to account for the 
availability of up to two observations per child. Examining the results from the one-step negative binomial 
model in column (1) of Table 4.1, the results indicate that public healthcare eligibility remains a significant 
determinant of GP visiting, with the results in the directions expected. For example, in comparison with 
those	with	‘no	cover’,	those	with	a	full	medical	card	have	almost	0.9	extra	GP	visits,	while	those	with	PHI	
but with no GP cover have 0.3 extra GP visits. Consistent with the data presented in Table 2.1, the average 
number of GP visits falls as the children age. All other variables have effects that are consistent with the 
cross-sectional results, with child health remaining an important determinant of GP visiting even after 
adjusting for differences between the children for which there is no observable variable (using child-
specific intercepts or random effects). The two-step results in columns (2) and (3) confirm that controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity does not change the main conclusions from the cross-sectional results in 
Chapter 2; i.e. that public healthcare eligibility, child health and mother’s health are large and significant 
determinants of GP visiting in Ireland.
Table 4.1:  Regression results (full sample, pooled estimates)
One-step model Two-step models
Negative Binomial Probit
i.e., contact decision
Truncated Negative 
Binomial, i.e. frequency 
decision
Wave 2 -0.486 -0.020 -0.604
(0.037)*** (0.006)*** (0.046)***
Public Healthcare Eligibility
Full medical card 0.949 0.102 0.855
(0.067)*** (0.009)*** (0.082)***
GP visit card 0.693 0.069 0.646
(0.122)*** (0.017)*** (0.150)***
PHI with GP cover 0.473 0.066 0.353
(0.067)*** (0.009)*** (0.084)***
PHI without GP cover 0.284 0.041 0.191
(0.068)*** (0.010)*** (0.085)**
No cover ref ref ref
Child Sex
Female -0.214 -0.018 -0.221
(0.041)*** (0.006)*** (0.049)***
Male ref ref ref
Child Health
Very healthy ref ref ref
Healthy 1.851 0.183 1.872
(0.048)*** (0.009)*** (0.056)***
Ill 3.727 0.259 3.848
(0.114)*** (0.036)*** (0.119)***
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One-step model Two-step models
Negative Binomial Probit
i.e., contact decision
Truncated Negative 
Binomial, i.e. frequency 
decision
Child Had Accident Requiring Medical Attention?
No accidents ref ref ref
Accidents 0.283 0.017 0.326
(0.062)*** (0.010)* (0.075)***
Birth-weight 0.045 0.009 0.017
(0.045) (0.007) (0.054)
Gestation
Less than 37 weeks 0.348 0.021 0.392
(0.101)*** (0.015) (0.117)***
38-41 weeks ref ref ref
42+ weeks -0.052 -0.003 -0.058
(0.064) (0.009) (0.079)
Maternal Smoking
No smoking ref ref ref
Smoking -0.031 -0.011 0.001
(0.048) (0.007) (0.057)
Was Child Breastfed?
Breastfeeding 0.154 0.020 0.128
(0.045)*** (0.007)*** (0.054)**
No breastfeeding ref ref ref
Maternal Self-Assessed Health
Excellent ref ref ref
Very good 0.161 0.027 0.106
(0.047)*** (0.007)*** (0.058)*
Good 0.257 0.031 0.221
(0.054)*** (0.008)*** (0.066)***
Fair/poor 0.308 0.038 0.256
(0.089)*** (0.015)*** (0.106)**
Maternal Chronic Illness
No chronic ref ref ref
Chronic 0.177 0.023 0.157
(0.059)*** (0.010)** (0.070)**
Maternal Education
Primary 0.184 0.050 0.046
(0.175) (0.025)** (0.211)
Lower secondary 0.134 0.016 0.111
(0.097) (0.015) (0.116)
Upper secondary 0.001 0.003 -0.012
(0.068) (0.010) (0.082)
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One-step model Two-step models
Negative Binomial Probit
i.e., contact decision
Truncated Negative 
Binomial, i.e. frequency 
decision
Non-degree -0.004 0.016 -0.078
(0.067) (0.010) (0.081)
Degree -0.023 -0.002 -0.029
(0.063) (0.010) (0.077)
Postgraduate ref ref ref
Maternal Employment Status
Employed ref ref ref
Self-employed -0.170 -0.017 -0.182
(0.091)* (0.014) (0.113)
Student 0.189 0.021 0.193
(0.124) (0.022) (0.143)
Unemployed 0.097 0.023 0.053
(0.086) (0.015) (0.105)
Home duties 0.021 -0.003 0.045
(0.050) (0.007) (0.061)
Marital Status
Single -0.080 -0.008 -0.080
(0.055) (0.008) (0.066)
Married ref ref ref
Separated/divorced -0.029 -0.000 -0.040
(0.111) (0.016) (0.132)
Ethnic Group
White ref ref ref
Non-white 0.455 0.057 0.350
(0.103)*** (0.013)*** (0.124)***
Childcare
Care outside home -0.143 -0.022 -0.102
(0.046)*** (0.007)*** (0.056)*
Care at home ref ref ref
Has Child Siblings?
Siblings 0.329 0.049 0.257
(0.045)*** (0.007)*** (0.055)***
No siblings ref ref ref
Household Income Quintile
Lowest Income Quintile -0.051 -0.038 0.088
(0.081) (0.012)*** (0.099)
2nd Income Quintile -0.150 -0.030 -0.072
(0.075)** (0.011)*** (0.093)
3rd Income Quintile -0.136 -0.026 -0.073
(0.066)** (0.010)** (0.082)
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One-step model Two-step models
Negative Binomial Probit
i.e., contact decision
Truncated Negative 
Binomial, i.e. frequency 
decision
4th Income Quintile -0.141 -0.011 -0.152
(0.059)** (0.009) (0.074)**
Highest Income Quintile ref ref ref
Missing Income Group -0.277 -0.050 -0.161
(0.093)*** (0.014)*** (0.113)
Household Location
Urban ref ref ref
Rural -0.024 0.004 -0.058
(0.041) (0.006) (0.050)
N 18,990 18,990 15,201
Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. 
Chapter 3 focused on the sub-sample of children who were private patients, i.e. without a full medical 
or GP visit card. The results indicated that private patients with lower incomes had a significantly lower 
number of GP visits (with the effects larger and more significant in Wave 1, and driven mainly by the 
reduced probability of having at least one GP visit among those with lower incomes, rather than a lower 
frequency of GP visiting). Table 4.2 replicates this analysis using the pooled data from Waves 1 and 2, and 
adjusts the standard errors of the estimates for the availability of up to two observations per child. Results 
from the one-step negative binomial model are presented in column (1), while results from the two-step 
probit and truncated negative binomial model are presented in columns (2) and (3). The results in column 
(1) indicate that PHI cover remains a significant determinant of GP visiting among private patients; for 
example, those with PHI with some cover for GP expenses have 0.4 extra GP visits compared to those with 
‘no	cover’.	Household	income	remains	a	significant	determinant	of	GP	visiting	among	children	without	a	
full medical or GP visit card, with those on lower incomes having significantly fewer GP visits than those on 
higher incomes. Consistent with the data presented in Table 3.1, the average number of GP visits falls as 
the children age. All other variables have effects that are consistent with the cross-sectional results; child 
health remains an important determinant of GP visiting even after adjusting for unobserved heterogeneity 
among the children. The results from the two-step model in columns (2) and (3) are again consistent with 
those from the cross-sectional model in Chapter 3.
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Table 4.2:  Regression results (private sample, pooled estimates)
One-step model Two-step models
Negative Binomial Probit
i.e. contact decision
Truncated Negative 
Binomial, i.e. frequency 
decision
Wave 2 -0.464
(0.041)***
-0.028
(0.007)***
-0.563
(0.052)***
Public Healthcare Eligibility
PHI with GP cover 0.376
(0.062)***
0.064
(0.010)***
0.267
(0.077)***
PHI without GP cover 0.203
(0.063)***
0.037
(0.010)***
0.119
(0.078)***
No cover ref ref ref
Household Income Quintile
Lowest Income Quintile -0.153
(0.080)*
-0.041
(0.014)***
-0.059
(0.099)
2nd Income Quintile -0.152
(0.071)**
-0.032
(0.013)**
-0.097
(0.088)
3rd Income Quintile -0.181
(0.068)***
-0.035
(0.012)***
-0.125
(0.085)
4th Income Quintile -0.119
(0.064)*
-0.009
(0.012)
-0.143
(0.079)*
Highest Income Quintile ref ref ref
Missing Income Group -0.336
(0.098)***
-0.056
(0.017)***
-0.259
(0.120)**
Child Sex
Female -0.150
(0.044)***
-0.017
(0.007)**
-0.148
(0.054)***
Male ref ref ref
Child Health
Very healthy ref ref ref
Healthy 1.697
(0.053)***
0.188
(0.011)***
1.724
(0.062)***
Ill 3.463
(0.162)***
0.249
(0.048)***
3.599
(0.165)***
Child Had Accident Requiring Medical Attention?
No accidents ref ref ref
Accidents 0.237
(0.072)***
0.012
(0.013)
0.294
(0.087)***
Birth-weight 0.015
(0.049)
0.004
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.060)
Gestation
Less than 37 weeks 0.401
(0.116)***
0.006
(0.020)
0.527
(0.133)***
ref ref ref
38-41 weeks -0.062
(0.072)
0.009
(0.012)
-0.125
(0.092)
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One-step model Two-step models
Negative Binomial Probit
i.e. contact decision
Truncated Negative 
Binomial, i.e. frequency 
decision
Maternal Smoking
No smoking ref ref ref
Smoking 0.026
(0.054)
-0.014
(0.009)
0.094
(0.066)
Was Child Breastfed?
Breastfeeding 0.119
(0.049)**
0.021
(0.008)***
0.082
(0.060)
No breastfeeding ref ref ref
Maternal Self-Assessed Health
Excellent ref ref ref
Very good 0.134
(0.048)***
0.030
(0.008)***
0.073
(0.061)
Good 0.210
(0.059)***
0.027
(0.010)***
0.184
(0.073)**
Fair/poor 0.293
(0.110)***
0.038
(0.020)*
0.260
(0.133)*
Maternal chronic Illness
No chronic ref ref ref
Chronic 0.133
(0.067)***
0.035
(0.013)
0.062
(0.081)
Maternal Education
Primary -0.069
(0.343)
0.072
(0.069)*
-0.394
(0.445)
Lower secondary 0.086
(0.137)
0.044
(0.023)
-0.064
(0.178)
Upper secondary -0.046
(0.072)
-0.011
(0.012)
-0.019
(0.087)
Non-degree -0.033
(0.066)
0.008
(0.012)
-0.081
(0.081)
Degree -0.033
(0.061)
-0.008
(0.011)
-0.025
(0.074)
Postgraduate ref ref ref
Maternal Employment Status
Employed ref ref ref
Self-employed -0.170
(0.089)*
-0.019
(0.016)
-0.181
(0.110)*
Student 0.155
(0.241)
0.050
(0.044)
0.016
(0.291)
Unemployed 0.293
(0.114)**
0.026
(0.021)
0.309
(0.135)**
Home duties 0.021
(0.054)
0.007
(0.009)
0.008
(0.067)
Marital Status
Single -0.110
(0.065)*
-0.019
(0.011)*
-0.083
(0.080)
Married ref ref ref
Separated/Divorced -0.202
(0.160)
-0.022
(0.025)
-0.183
(0.196)
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Notes: * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. 
4.4 IMPACT OF CHANGES IN PUBLIC HEALTHCARE ENTITLEMENTS ON GP VISITING
In this section we use the availability of longitudinal data on the child’s pattern of GP visiting alongside 
information on their eligibility for free GP services at the point of delivery to get a more causal understanding 
of the relationship between these variables. 
4.4.1 PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING
Ideally, a randomised control experiment would be used to estimate the causal effect of eligibility for a 
medical card on use of GP care. Here, children would be randomly allocated to an intervention group (free 
care) or a control group (no free care). The random allocation would make sure that the two groups did 
not vary along any dimension other than the availability of free care. The experimenter would wait for 
a period and then compare GP use between the groups. However, the costs and ethical considerations 
surrounding experimental studies mean that they are rarely employed in health economics (an exception 
was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment in the USA in the 1970s where individuals were randomly 
assigned to a number of different health insurance plans, which differed in the degree of cost-sharing) 
(Manning et al., 1987; Keeler, 1992; Newhouse and Insurance Experiment Group, 1993). 
Propensity score matching simulates the experimental conditions outlined above by matching treatment 
and control observations that are similar in terms of their observed characteristics. The method produces 
unbiased estimates of the effect of the treatment (in this application, public healthcare eligibility) on the 
outcome of interest (the number of GP visits). However, standard propensity score approaches cannot 
deal with the possibility that there may also be certain unobserved differences in characteristics between 
treatment and control observations (e.g. time preference rates, attitudes towards medical care, etc). The 
standard propensity score approach is extended to consider a difference-in-difference propensity score 
One-step model Two-step models
Negative Binomial Probit
i.e. contact decision
Truncated Negative 
Binomial, i.e. frequency 
decision
Ethnic Group
White ref ref ref
Non-white 0.935
(0.135)***
0.078
(0.019)***
1.016
(0.173)***
Childcare
Care outside home -0.143
(0.480)***
-0.026
(0.008)***
-0.094
(0.059)
Care at home ref ref ref
Has Child Siblings?
Siblings 0.239
(0.049)***
0.047
(0.009)***
0.157
(0.060)***
No siblings ref ref ref
Household Location
Urban ref ref ref
Rural 0.048
(0.045)
0.010
(0.008)
0.020
(0.055)
N 12,870 12,870 10,114
39 Unfortunately, the number of observations involved in other transitions is too small to generate meaningful results (e.g. there are only 53 
children who transitioned from no cover in Wave 1 to PHI with some cover for GP expenses in Wave 2). Table A4.1 in the Appendix to this 
chapter provides data on the number of children transitioning between different eligibility categories in the period between Wave 1 and Wave 
2. Further waves of the data are necessary in order to broaden the analysis to consider these and other transitions in public healthcare eligibility.
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Control Group Treatment Group
w=1 w=2 Outcome
(w=2) – (w=1)
w=1 w=2 Outcome
(w=2) – (w=1)
Gaining a medical card 2.445 2.151 -0.289 2.396 2.767 0.372
Losing a medical card 3.241 3.154 -0.054 2.902 2.673 -0.232
estimator, which calculates the difference in the outcomes for the treated and control observations and 
thereby removes any variation in time-invariant unobserved characteristics between treatment and 
control observations. This assumes that treatment and control groups are affected in the same way by 
the same macro shocks between control and treatment periods, and that any unobserved differences in 
characteristics between treatment and control groups are constant over time and thus eliminated in the 
analysis. This approach was first developed by Heckman et al. (1997) in an application analysing the labour-
market outcomes of participants in a training programme for disadvantaged workers, and subsequently 
applied in a number of different contexts (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; Aassve et al., 2007; Lechner and 
Vazquez-Alvarez, 2003; García Gómez and López Nicolás, 2006; Trujillo et al., 2005; Gorg and Strobl, 2006).
Essentially, applying this approach here compares the outcomes of children who are similar pre-treatment 
and who differ only in their exposure to the treatment (i.e. change in medical-card status). By calculating 
the difference in the outcome measure (GP visits), we control for time-invariant unobserved differences 
between treatment and control observations. This chapter estimates the treatment effect for two 
transitions: 
•	 gaining	a	full	medical	or	GP	visit	card	(i.e.	removing	GP	user	fees),	and
•	 losing	a	full	medical	or	GP	visit	card	(i.e.	introducing	GP	user	fees).39  
The propensity score matching method involves two steps: first, the probability of treatment is estimated 
using	 a	 probit	 model	 to	 generate	 a	 	 ‘propensity	 score’	 (i.e.	 the	 individual’s	 predicted	 probability	 of	
treatment). Second, the number of GP visits of treated and control observations is compared, but only 
against those in the other group with a similar propensity score so as to obtain an estimate of the 
treatment effect. As the probability of two observations having exactly the same propensity score is zero 
(as the propensity score variable is continuous), the comparison observation or group of observations for 
each treated observation is chosen according to various alternative measures of proximity (e.g. nearest 
neighbour, radius, kernel weights etc). The essential difference between the various methods is the weight 
given to each control observation. The Appendix to this chapter contains further details on the propensity 
score matching method.
4.4.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Before discussing estimation results, Table 4.3 presents the change in number of GP visits between Wave 
1 and Wave 2 (the outcome measure) for both transitions that are considered (i.e. gaining or losing a full 
medical or GP visit card). Using the pooled data, the statistics indicate that, on average, the change in 
GP visiting is greater for treatment observations with little change in GP visiting patterns among control 
observations. In addition, the changes in GP visiting rates among treatment groups are in the direction 
expected. The propensity score method refines this comparison by only comparing outcomes for treatment 
and control observations that have similar propensity scores, using various proximity criteria (nearest 
neighbour, radius etc). This ensures that observations are compared that are similar in every observable 
respect except their exposure to the treatment.
Table 4.3:  Number of GP visits, control and treatment groups (Wave 1, Wave 2 and difference 
between Wave 1 and Wave 2)
Note: The outcome measure refers to the difference in the number of GP visits between Wave 1 (w=1) and Wave 2 (w=2).
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The estimates from the probit model (not shown), which are used to calculate the propensity score, suggest 
that participation in the treatment (i.e. gaining a medical card) is significantly associated with a variety of 
pre-treatment characteristics, including lower household income and lower levels of mother’s education. 
Table 4.4 shows that the estimates suggest that the effect of gaining a full medical or GP visit card is to 
increase the average number of GP visits by 0.6, and all estimates are significant (see column 1 of Table 4.4). 
The pre-treatment average number of GP visits for treated observations was approximately 2.4 GP visits; 
this means that the effect of gaining a full medical or GP visit card is to increase the number of GP visits by 
approximately 25 per cent.
Table 4.4:  Propensity score matching estimates, effect on number of GP visits
Notes: 
*** significant at 1 per cent level; ** significant at 5 per cent level; * significant at 10 per cent level.
k refers to the number of nearest neighbour matches involved.
   refers to the size of the calliper (the default is no restriction).
All matching is with replacement and on the common support.
For those losing a full medical or GP visit card, the same procedure is followed in estimating the treatment 
effect. The binary probit model of losing a full medical or GP visit card shows that this is associated with 
higher household income and maternal education. Table 4.4 (column 2) shows that all the estimates of the 
effect of losing a full medical or GP visit card are statistically insignificant. At face value this would suggest 
that losing a card does not decrease the child’s use of GP services, but caution should be exercised as the 
number of treated observations used in this analysis was small (260 cases).
(1)
Gaining a medical card
(2)
Losing a medical card
Nearest neighbour (k=1) 0.550 0.145
(0.129)*** (0.476)
Nearest neighbour (k=5) 0.577 -0.106
(0.144)*** (0.387)
Nearest neighbour (k=10) 0.540 -0.199
(0.137)*** (0.365)
Nearest neighbour (k=20) 0.583 -0.222
(0.133)*** (0.318)
Nearest neighbour (k=1,    =0.001) 0.566 0.113
(0.166)*** (0.563)
Nearest neighbour (k=5,    =0.001) 0.592 -0.249
(0.141)*** (0.445)
Nearest neighbour (k=10,    =0.001) 0.560 -0.229
(0.146)*** (0.445)
Nearest neighbour (k=20,    =0.001) 0.572 -0.288
(0.143)*** (0.392)
Radius 0.636 -0.206
(0.115)*** (0.274)
Kernel 0.550 0.145
(0.129)*** (0.476)
N 6,443 2,443
N Control 5,429 2,183
N Treatment 1,014 260
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The estimated effects of gaining a full medical or GP visit card are somewhat smaller than the effects found 
when using the pooled cross-sectional data reported in Table 4.1. However, the sample used to estimate 
the propensity score matching results is confined to those who were private patients in Wave 1, and either 
remained as private patients in Wave 2 (control group), or became eligible for a full medical GP visit card 
in Wave 2 (treatment group). The marginal effects for full medical- and GP visit-card eligibility in Table 4.1 
are	based	on	a	comparison	with	those	with	‘no	cover’	as	the	reference	group.	
A number of additional analyses are carried out to check the robustness of the results. First, the effect of 
gaining or losing a full medical or GP visit card, for the sample of children who did not change their health 
status, was also investigated. Unfortunately, for those losing a full medical or GP visit card, the number 
of treatment observations is small, meaning that the results are not well defined. For those gaining a full 
medical or GP visit card, the estimated treatment effects are slightly smaller (average 0.5 extra GP visits), 
but remain statistically significant. Second, the analysis in Table 4.4 is repeated but those who gained/lost 
a full medical card are distinguished from those who gained/lost a GP visit card. As expected, the numbers 
gaining/losing a GP visit card were too small to generate significant effects, but the results for gaining/
losing a full medical card are consistent with the aggregated effects (0.8 and -0.4 respectively, although the 
effect of losing a full medical card was again insignificant). Finally, examination was made of the effect of 
gaining/losing PHI with cover for GP expenses, but the number of treatment observations was too small to 
undertake a meaningful analysis.
The added value of the analyses based on propensity score matching methods is that it is possible to 
distinguish between those gaining and losing a full medical or GP visit card, and more accurately follow 
the same individuals through time. Based on the data available, the results indicate that the change in GP 
visiting behaviour is larger and more significant for those gaining a full medical or GP visit card than for 
those losing a full medical or GP visit card, in direct contrast to the results for the adult population found 
by Nolan (2008a). The results for children also suggest an asymmetry in the effects: the deterrent effect of 
charging for GP visits (which faces those who lose a full medical or GP visit card) is less than the incentive 
effect of free GP visits (which faces those who gain a full medical or GP visit card). However, it must be 
remembered that the numbers losing a card between Waves 1 and 2 were small and the estimated effects 
were statistically insignificant. Further waves of the data are necessary to confirm these initial findings.
4.5 DISCUSSION 
This chapter has built on the preceding three by using the longitudinal nature of Growing Up in Ireland 
to examine use of GP services. Longitudinal data and analyses provide two main advantages over cross-
sectional approaches: first, having repeated measures of healthcare use for the same individuals allows 
us to adjust for characteristics that do not change for each individual over time but may influence 
differences in use of GP services between individuals (so-called time-invariant characteristics, which are 
often unobserved). Second, it is possible to examine the causal impact of public healthcare eligibility by 
leveraging change in eligibility over time whilst adjusting for all other characteristics. 
The results from this chapter confirm the findings from Chapter 2 that use of GP services falls as children age, 
and that child health, mother’s health and eligibility for free or subsidised care are important determinants. 
Comparison with the results from the models in Chapter 2 also suggests that the longitudinal estimates of 
mean frequency of GP use are very similar to those estimated using the cross-sectional approach. 
The use of the propensity score matching approach in this chapter for the causal analysis of changes in 
eligibility for free or subsidised care is important, particularly in the context of recent policy changes in 
relation to free GP care for children. The propensity score matching analyses here suggest that children 
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40 An exception was the RAND Health Insurance Experiment in the USA in the 1970s where individuals were randomly assigned to a number 
of different health insurance plans, which differed in the degree to which copayments were levied on the use of various health services; see 
Manning et al. (1987), Newhouse and Insurance Experiment Group (1993) and Keeler (1992). 
Wave 2
Full medical card GP visit card PHI with GP cover PHI without GP 
cover
No cover
Wave 1
Full medical 
card
2,037 134 42 36 130
GP visit card 132 67 15 17 39
PHI with GP 
cover
181 47 1,752 696 190
PHI without 
GP cover
196 54 637 1,135 179
No cover 507 94 53 62 939
whose families gain access to a full medical or GP visit card increase their use by approximately 0.6 of a GP 
visit more per year on average. This represents a 25% increase on the 2.4 average for non-card holders. 
This result, coupled with the fact that GP visit-card holders visit less frequently due to the absence of 
prescription medicine cover, suggests that the overall increase in use after the establishment of a scheme 
giving free care to the under-sixes would be moderate. In addition, this analysis would suggest that 
children receiving a GP visit card would still attend less frequently than children currently in receipt of a 
full medical card, largely because of differences in underlying health status and other characteristics that 
influence attendance.
4.6 APPENDIX
4.6.1  TRANSITIONS IN ELIGIBILITY GROUPS
Table A4.1: Transitions in eligibility groups, Wave 1 – Wave 2
Note: The data are interpreted as follows: for those with a full medical card in Wave 1, 2,037 remained with a full medical card in Wave 2, 
while	134	had	a	GP	visit	card,	42	had	PHI	with	GP	cover,	36	had	PHI	with	no	GP	cover	and	130	had	‘no	cover’	by	Wave	2.
4.6.2  PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
In Chapter 4, propensity score matching techniques are used to evaluate the impact of a change in public 
healthcare eligibility status on GP visiting rates. As noted, two transitions are considered in this report:
•	 gaining	a	full	medical	or	GP	visit	card	(i.e.	removing	GP	user	fees),	and	
•	 losing	a	full	medical	or	GP	visit	card	(i.e.	introducing	GP	user	fees).
In carrying out analyses such as these, the problem is essentially one of missing data; individuals are in 
either the treatment group or the control group, but never both. Constructing the counterfactual is thus 
the central problem facing those involved in the evaluation of a particular treatment; i.e. how would an 
individual behave if they had not received the treatment? Ideally, experimental data would be available 
whereby individuals are randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups. Then averaging over the 
full sample would give an unbiased estimate of the effect of the treatment. However, the costs and ethical 
considerations surrounding experimental studies mean that they are rarely employed.40 
 
The standard means of isolating the independent effect of treatment is to control for observable 
differences between treated and control observations using regression methods. However, the imposition 
of functional form assumptions, as well as the possibility of insufficient common support (i.e. for any set 
of values of the independent variables, there may be insufficient numbers of both treated and control 
observations) means that such methods are not without problems (LaLonde, 1986). Alternative solutions to 
41 A number of papers from the US have used differences in the rate of expansion of Medicaid across states and time as an instrument for 
public health insurance in analyses on the impact of insurance on the use of health services by US children (Currie and Gruber, 1996; Currie et 
al., 2008). See also Chapter 1.
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the sample selection problem, such as the Heckman sample selection estimator or the use of instrumental 
variables estimation, rely heavily on the identification of suitable instruments; i.e. variables that affect the 
probability of receiving the treatment, but not the subsequent outcome of interest. In the application, it 
is difficult to identify a factor that would be correlated with public healthcare eligibility, but unrelated to 
the use of GP services.41  For this reason, this report concentrated on the application of matching methods 
to the evaluation of the effect of public healthcare eligibility status on GP visiting patterns. 
Matching methods match treatment and control observations on the basis of observable characteristics 
only; i.e. it is assumed that there are no unobservable differences in characteristics between treatment and 
control observations. This report exploits the fact that there are two observations per child by combining 
matching methods with a difference-in-difference estimator (Heckman et al., 1997; Aassve et al., 2007; Gorg 
and Strobl, 2006). Such an approach controls for unobserved time-invariant differences in characteristics 
between treatment and control observations, and thus provides a more reliable estimate of the effect of the 
treatment on the outcome of interest. This approach compares the outcomes of individuals who are similar 
pre-treatment and differ only in their exposure to the treatment. By first computing the difference in the 
value between periods to create a new outcome measure, control is made for time-invariant unobservable 
differences between treatment and control observations. 
Assume that each individual i has two potential outcomes, Yi1 (treatment, e.g. medical or GP visit card) 
and Yi0 (control, e.g. no medical or GP visit card). The average effect of the treatment is given by E(Yi1 – Yi0). 
However, since it is not possible to observe the same person in both states (Yi0 and Yi1), the average 
treatment	effect	on	the	‘treated’	population	alone	is	used	(ATET):
  
(1)
where Di is the dichotomous indicator of treatment, with 1 indicating that individual i receives the 
treatment, and 0 otherwise. Of course, identification of the second part of expression is necessary (1). 
Assuming conditional independence between treatment and outcomes – i.e. given a set of observable 
characteristics  xi, the outcomes of the non-treated group are what the treated outcomes would have been 
had they not been treated (selection occurs only on observable characteristics) – the following also holds:
 
 (2)
and an unbiased estimate of the ATET can be obtained from:
 
 (3)
Due to the practical difficulties involved in matching observations when there are a large number of 
covariates, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that summarising the observed characteristics of each 
observation into a single index (the propensity score, i.e. the predicted probability of participation in the 
treatment) makes matching feasible (Becker and Ichino, 2002). The probability of receiving the treatment 
is estimated, conditional on a vector of pre-treatment characteristics x:
  (4)
where F(.)  is usually the cumulative standard normal distribution function (i.e. a probit model). Propensity 
score matching entails modelling the probability of participation, calculating the predicted probability of 
participation for each individual (the propensity score) and matching individuals with similar propensity 
scores. 
Growing Up in Ireland • UNDERSTANDING USE OF GENERAL PRACTITIONER SERVICES AMONG CHILDREN IN IRELAND
72
Since the probability of two observations having exactly the same propensity score is zero (as the propensity 
score variable is continuous), the comparison observation or group of observations for each treated 
observation is chosen according to various alternative measures of proximity (e.g. nearest neighbour, radius, 
kernel weights, etc). The essential difference between the various methods is the weight given to each 
control observation. Nearest-neighbour matching entails finding a control observation with the closest 
propensity score for each treated observation. Once each treated observation is matched with a control 
observation, the difference in outcomes between the treated and control observations is computed, and 
averaged over all observations to gain an estimate of the average treatment effect. However, a disadvantage 
of the nearest neighbour method is that while some matches may be poor (i.e. dissimilar propensity scores), 
they still contribute to the calculation of the average treatment effect. A variant of nearest-neighbour 
matching is calliper matching, whereby a control observation with a propensity score falling within a 
specified range of the propensity score of a treated observation is considered a match. Hence, in moving 
from the nearest-neighbour to the calliper method, the quality of the matches is improved, but at a cost 
of fewer observations (Bryson et al., 2002). Nearest-neighbour and calliper matching can be extended to 
allow for multiple matches for each treated observation, thus considering matches of a slightly poorer 
quality. Radius matching extends the calliper matching technique to consider all possible matches (i.e. 
not just nearest-neighbour matches) within the specified range of the propensity score. The smaller the 
dimension of the radius, the stronger the possibility that some treated observations will not be treated, 
but the better is the quality of the matches. With kernel matching, treated observations are matched with 
a weighted average of all controls, with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between 
propensity scores of treated and controls. This means that exact matches get a large weight and poorer 
matches a smaller weight (Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
While there are no clear criteria for choosing one method of propensity score matching over another 
(see also Bryson et al., 2002), it is clear that the different methods involve trade-offs between the quality 
and quantity of the matches. For example, when matching within a defined calliper, the estimates from 
the nearest-neighbour methods become more significant. Even when the number of possible matches is 
increased (i.e. increase k), the calliper method produces very similar results. The kernel estimate is the same 
as that for the one-to-one nearest-neighbour estimate within calliper, and this is consistent with the fact 
that all possible matches are considered but are weighted in accordance with the difference in propensity 
scores (i.e. exact matches are given a large weight, and poor matches a small weight). In effect, by increasing 
k and matching within calliper or by using the kernel method, a wider range of possible matches can be 
considered, yet the quality of those matches can be controlled. For this reason, the estimates of the ATET 
from the nearest neighbour within calliper and kernel methods are regarded as most accurate.
As there are two observations per child, it is possible to extend the standard analysis of treatment effects 
(e.g. in the application, the effect of having a full medical or GP visit card on GP visiting rates) by following 
the same individuals through time and analysing the effect of changing public healthcare eligibility on the 
change in GP visiting patterns. This report, therefore, estimates the ATET for two transitions: gaining a full 
medical or GP visit card (i.e. removing GP user fees), and losing a full medical or GP visit card (i.e. introducing 
GP user fees). To estimate the propensity score, a binary probit model is estimated of the probability of 
treatment, with various pre-treatment individual and household characteristics as explanatory variables (see 
Section 4.4). Nearest-neighbour, radius and kernel matching methods are used to estimate the treatment 
effects for both transitions. For the nearest-neighbour method, one-to-one matching (with and without 
calliper) is used, and multiple matches are permissible (again, with and without calliper). In all cases, the 
common support condition is imposed, as this may improve the quality of the matches used to estimate 
the average treatment effect (Becker and Ichino, 2002), although in practice very few observations do not 
satisfy this condition. Matching with replacement is used, meaning that a control observation can be a 
match for more than one treated unit. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping, with 50 iterations 
found to produce stable results. The models are all estimated using the psmatch2 command in Stata Version 
9.0.
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Chapter 5
 SUMMARY AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
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5.1 SUMMARY
The  provision of safe and effective healthcare on the basis of individual need rather than ability to pay has 
been an objective of successive Irish health strategies and continues into the current strategy document 
for the improvement of population health in Ireland. However, the current system of health financing for 
primary care in Ireland raises concerns about whether primary care is actually available to all on the basis 
of need rather than ability to pay. This concern partly motivated political commitments for free GP care at 
the point of delivery for all in the 2011 Programme for Government (Government of Ireland, 2011). More 
pertinently, the Irish Government also made a commitment to make GP care for all children aged under six 
free in Budget 2014. Registration of children under six for free GP care began in 2015. Free GP care for all 
children from age six to 17 is a commitment under the current Programme for Government (Government 
of Ireland, 2016). In this context, analyses such as those included in this report provide important evidence 
on the impact of different healthcare entitlement structures on GP visiting behaviour among children.
The introduction to this report set out four key questions that this study was to address:
•	 Does	eligibility	for	free	GP	care	affect	children’s	use	of	GP	services?	
•	 Does	type	of	PHI	cover	affect	children’s	use	of	GP	services?	
•	 Are	user	fees	for	GP	care	a	particular	burden	on	children	from	low-income	families	without	
medical cards? Previous research on the adult population (Nolan, 2008b) found that the deterrent 
effect of user fees was also present for those at the top of the income distribution. 
•	 As	children	depend	on	their	parents	for	decision-making	in	relation	to	healthcare	use,	do	parental	
characteristics (e.g. family structure, education, employment status, etc) affect children’s use of GP 
services?
5.2 DOES ELIGIBILITY FOR FREE GP CARE AFFECT CHILDREN’S USE OF GP   
 SERVICES?
The answer to the first question appears to be yes. Using a variety of different approaches and techniques, 
the analyses contained in this report (in Chapters 2 and 4 in particular) strongly suggest that eligibility for 
free care via a full medical or GP visit card is associated with a higher propensity to seek care and a higher 
frequency of attendance even adjusting for a range of other factors such as the child’s health status. This 
raises concerns that some children may not be receiving the health care that they require because of 
financial constraints for their parents. This issue is particularly marked for children whose developmental 
trajectory may be altered for the worse, leading to poorer health and wellbeing over the life-course. 
While these effects persist even after controlling for a wide variety of child and parental health and socio-
economic characteristics, the obvious question to ask is whether the results for eligibility are affected by 
possible adverse selection into the various eligibility groups. A small proportion of full medical cards and 
GP visit cards are granted on a discretionary basis (i.e. on the basis of particular health needs, rather than 
low income), and those with private health insurance with GP cover choose their particular health plan. 
In this case, it is important to include a comprehensive set of indicators to control for need and other 
variables that may influence eligibility status (Deb and Trivedi, 1997). 
It	is	also	possible	that	the	increased	GP	visiting	among	the	GP	visit-card	group	is	due	to	‘pent-up’	demand/
selection effects. If so, this would suggest that the current level of use among those with a GP visit card 
would decline over time as their reservoir of needs was met. US research on the effects of becoming eligible 
for Medicare insurance at the age of 65 has demonstrated evidence for pent-up demand (McWilliams et 
al., 2003), while it is also possible that those with greatest need for GP care are more likely to apply for and 
take up the GP visit card. Previous analysis of the adult population has found some evidence that there 
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are pent-up demand/selection effects associated with GP visit-card eligibility in Ireland (Nolan and Smith, 
2012). 
5.3 DOES TYPE OF PHI COVER AFFECT CHILDREN’S USE OF GP SERVICES? 
Once again, the evidence suggests that access to private health insurance (PHI) which has GP cover has a 
significant impact on the average number of visits that the child will make to the GP, after adjusting for 
many other factors, including the child’s health needs (see Chapters 2 and 4). Interestingly, despite facing 
the same price for GP care, those with PHI with no GP cover had significantly more GP visits than those 
with	‘no	cover’.	It	is	of	course	possible	that	the	variable	for	those	with	PHI	with	no	GP	cover	may	also	be	
a proxy for the higher incomes and other resources of families with PHI, which is not already measured in 
the income and other socio-economic variables used in our analyses. It is also possible that the purchase of 
PHI, conditional on income, may be an indirect measure of a greater propensity to consult the GP since it 
could indicate risk-averse behaviour (i.e. the purchase of insurance). 
5.4 ARE USER FEES FOR GP CARE A PARTICULAR BURDEN ON CHILDREN FROM  
 LOW-INCOME FAMILIES WITHOUT MEDICAL CARDS?
A GP visit for patients without a medical card costs €50 on average, before any associated prescription 
medicine costs. This clearly gives rise to concerns that paying for medical care may be a burden on families, 
with consequences for their propensity to use medical care. Chapter 3 examined this question by looking 
at whether poorer families without a full medical or GP visit card were less likely to visit their GP than more 
affluent families without a full medical or GP visit card. Using the first and second waves of the Infant 
Cohort of Growing Up in Ireland, results showed that children from higher-income families without a full 
medical or GP visit card did have a significantly higher number of GP visits than those from lower-income 
families without a full medical or GP visit card, but that this only appeared to be so in the first wave of the 
study. As explained in Chapter 3, this pattern may reflect the timing of the data collection in that some of 
the poorer members of the cohort would have received full medical or GP visit cards by the time the Wave 
2 fieldwork was carried out.  
5.5 HOW DO PARENTAL CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCE THE USE OF GP SERVICES  
 AMONG CHILDREN?
GP visiting behaviour among children is different to that of adults in that the primary decision-maker is 
generally the mother (Case and Paxson, 2001) rather than the child, and this clearly had an influence on 
the results. Adjusting for other characteristics, it was found that mother’s health status is a significant 
determinant of her child’s use of GP services, with other characteristics of the mother (e.g. employment 
status, marital status) largely insignificant (Chapters 2 and 4). In addition, in contrast to the descriptive 
statistics and findings from the international literature, it was also clear that mother’s education had very 
limited effects. 
5.6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This report has provided evidence of the complex relationship between the characteristics of the child and 
family, and the child’s use of GP care. The primary determinant of the number of GP visits is the child’s level 
of health need, and other research has shown that this is strongly influenced by the characteristics of the 
household. It was clear that the health of both the mother and child was strongly related to the income 
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42 This is a difficult question to assess empirically. It is not possible to answer the question without more detailed information on GP 
consultations (reason, length, etc), although there is plenty of international evidence that user fees deter both necessary as well as 
unnecessary healthcare use (Robinson, 2002).
of the family. Family income therefore has an indirect impact on GP use through the child’s health status. 
However, this report also provides evidence that the income of the family has a further indirect effect 
on GP use through the eligibility of the family for free GP care. For families without free GP care, there 
was also some evidence that children from lower-income backgrounds faced barriers to accessing GP care 
(primarily at Wave 1). Whilst the report did not have the evidence available to assess whether lack of care 
had a detrimental effect on the child’s health and wellbeing, evidence was presented from other countries 
that such a relationship can and often does exist. 
These findings have important policy implications. Aside from the question of equity involved in the 
financial rationing of healthcare, it may also be that timely treatment in primary care may be more cost-
effective in the long-run if lack of treatment leads to worse health and more expensive (possibly hospital) 
treatment at a later date. For children, lack of early intervention may also mean a lifetime of subsequent 
treatment as well as a lower quality of life and other adverse educational and labour-market consequences 
in later life. While the data do not allow us to assess the extent to which those without a full medical or 
GP	visit	card	in	the	Irish	context	are	forgoing	‘necessary’	care,42  evidence from other settings suggests that 
removing financial barriers to access to healthcare among children has significant impacts on child health, 
and later-life outcomes.
Notwithstanding current policy proposals on universal GP care for the under-18s, this report also showed 
that income was an important determinant of GP visiting for private patients – i.e. those without a full 
medical or GP visit card, particularly at age nine months. By age three however, this effect was largely 
absent, suggesting that wider eligibility for a full medical or GP visit card during the recession protected 
those who had previously been above the threshold. 
Finally, the estimates from the propensity score matching analysis are directly relevant to current policy 
proposals. These showed that those children who became eligible for a full medical or GP visit card between 
the age of nine months and three years increased their number of GP visits by approximately 0.6 visits per 
annum, or approximately 25 per cent. This estimate does not distinguish between gaining a full medical 
and a GP visit card, and does not take into account possible changes in health need that also occurred. 
However, the analysis provides additional information for policymakers currently tasked with extending 
free GP care to other groups of children, and may aid them in costing future proposals and assessing the 
capacity implications of this increased demand.
5.7 STUDY LIMITATIONS
A number of criticisms could be made of the data and methodology used in this report. First, the recall 
period for GP visits – one year – is long when compared to the period of the last month used in the 
European Health Interview Survey and the Healthy Ireland Survey. Such a long recall period could give rise 
to concerns that the numbers given are not accurate and that bias may result (Behan et al., 2014). However, 
although absolute frequencies of GP attendance may differ between approaches depending on the recall 
period, data-collection methods and population coverage, comparison of results shows that the relativities 
between groups defined by their eligibility for free care are actually relatively stable.
Second, the long recall period may also reduce the extent to which it is possible to safely assume that the 
‘single	illness	spell’	assumption	underlying	the	two-part	model	is	valid	(see	also	Gerdtham,	1997;	Jiménez-
Martín et al., 2002). This is a more difficult issue to examine empirically but examination of the pattern of 
findings from the one- and two-part models reveals relatively stable findings.
Third, the analyses in Chapters 2 and 4 use cross-sectional data, and indicate associations between eligibility 
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and GP use, rather than causal relationships. While the use of longitudinal data-analysis techniques in 
Chapter 4 allows us to further control for time-invariant characteristics that may be important in determining 
healthcare use (e.g. attitudes to risk), we cannot account for differences in time-varying characteristics 
between waves that might also (partly) explain the change in GP use. For example, a child could gain a full 
medical or GP visit card because they became ill and/or their parent(s) could no longer work; the increase 
in GP visiting observed could therefore be due partly to their poorer health status and greater health needs 
rather than solely the incentive effects of gaining a full medical or GP visit card. Therefore, the estimated 
effects are likely to be upper bounds on the true effects of gaining/losing a full medical or GP visit card.
Finally, although the patterning of healthcare use is interesting from an equity perspective, the ultimate 
question is whether the current system of healthcare entitlements has an impact on health outcomes. 
Some studies have looked at this (by first looking at the effect of eligibility on use, and then examining 
the effect of use on health) (for example, see Card et al., 2009, and Currie and Gruber, 1996), and results 
suggest that the differentials in healthcare access may indeed be important for outcomes. Such research 
is supported by research for Ireland on the population of older people which showed that the higher rate 
of GP visits that followed the introduction of automatic entitlement to a full medical card for all over-70s 
in 2001, coupled with improved guidelines on prescribing among GPs, significantly altered the pattern 
of mortality for those aged 65+ in the period to 2005 (Layte et al., 2011). Such results suggest that the 
concerns of this report about the impact of access to care on child health may be well founded. 
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